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Fallout from 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: 
Fractured Arbitration Systems in the 
Unionized Workplace 
Ann C. Hodges* 
The Supreme Court's decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett1 for the first 
time held that union-negotiated waivers of employee rights to litigate their legal 
claims2 are enforceable.3 As a result, employers and unions must decide whether 
to negotiate provisions that bind employees to arbitrate, rather than litigate, statu-
tory claims. The choices made by employers and unions will affect the arbitration 
process, including legalism in arbitration. This article will analyze the potential 
for increased legalization of arbitration in the unionized workplace as a result of 
Pyett.4 
First, the article will review the history of arbitration of statutory employment 
claims, including the Pyett decision. Second, the article will look at the history 
and causes of legalism in arbitration. Then the article will consider the probable 
responses of employers and unions to Pyett. While predictions are necessarily 
speculative, it is likely that some unionized employers will seek to require em-
ployees to arbitrate statutory claims, perhaps in higher percentages than in the 
nonunion workplace. While unions may, and perhaps should, resist, many future 
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) may contain such provisions. The ar-
ticle then discusses the alternative dispute resolution approaches that might be 
negotiated. The article concludes that if statutory claims are incorporated in the 
collectively bargained grievance and arbitration procedure, that procedure will 
become more legalistic, perhaps even in cases where no legal claim is involved. If 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. The author is grateful for valuable research assis-
tance from Jemika Davenport, Paul Falabella, Mary Hallerman, and Joyce Yoon and for the comments 
and questions of the participants at the symposium. The article also benefited from the comments and 
questions of participants in the panels on 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett at the 2009 AALS Workshop on 
Work Law and the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 62d Annual Meeting in 2009. 
I. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
2. In this article, I will use the terms statutory claims and legal claims interchangeably while recog-
nizing that they are not equivalent. In the cases litigated to date regarding arbitration of employment 
law claims, most have involved federal and state statutory claims, primarily discrimination. However, 
a few cases have involved constitutional claims or state common law claims as well. See, e.g., Schu-
macher v. Souderton Area Sch. Dist., No. CIV. A. 99-1515, 2000 WL 72047 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2000) 
(holding that employee claiming violation of constitutional rights to due process and equal protection 
was not required to arbitrate under the collective bargaining agreement); Mercuro v. Superior Court, 
116 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 671, 673, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to order arbitration of plaintiffs claims 
which included, inter alia, common law claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy). The 
Pyett rationale is not limited to statutory claims. See Alan Hyde, Labor Arbitration of Discrimination 
Claims after 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett: letting Discrimination Defendants Decide Whether Plaintiff May 
Sue Them, OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the impact of Pyett on a varie-
ty of legal claims). 
3. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1474. 
4. Legislation that would reverse Pyett is pending in the Senate. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 
S. 931, I I Ith Cong.§ 402(b)(2) (referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 29, 2009). 
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a separate arbitration procedure for statutory claims is negotiated, however, the 
new procedure may become the vehicle for legal claims, returning the contractual 
procedure to its traditional and favored role as an extension of the contract negoti-
ation process.5 There are many legal and practical hurdles to creating an effective 
separate procedure for statutory claims in the unionized workplace, however, lead-
ing to substantial uncertainty about the future of arbitration in the unionized 
workplace. 
I. THE HISTORY OF ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS 
For many years, the courts regularly refused to enforce agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims, but in the 1980s the Supreme Court, in a trilogy of cases, 
reversed its position.6 In 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the 
Court enforced an agreement to arbitrate a statutory employment law claim for the 
first time.7 Following the Court's reversal of its position, the law regarding arbi-
tration of statutory claims developed along two different lines in the union and 
nonunion workplaces. Nonunion employees could waive their right to a judicial 
forum for statutory claims, unless the statute at issue clearly precluded it.8 Courts 
enforce such waivers, even if they are compelled as a condition of employment, 
unless the employee can defeat the arbitration requirement by showing that there 
was in fact no agreement, that the agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable (typical-
ly on grounds of unconscionability), or that the agreement to arbitrate effectively 
precludes statutory enforcement. Unionized employees, however, relied on Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., which held in 1974 that despite unsuccessful arbi-
tration of his unjust termination claim, an employee could proceed in court with 
his race discrimination claim based on the same facts, but alleging a violation of 
Title VII.9 The Court in Gardner-Denver emphasized the distinction between 
5. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 580, 581 
(1960) (describing arbitration as an extension of the negotiation process which gives meaning and 
content to the agreement); Theodore St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A 
Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (1977) (noting that 
the arbitrator functions as the parties' "designated 'reader' of the contract," a ''.joint alter ego for the 
purpose of striking whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unantici-
pated omissions of the initial agreement"). 
6. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (enforcing agree-
ment to arbitrate claims under the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220 (1987) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate claims under§ IO(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate claims 
based on antitrust law). 
7. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
8. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (holding nonunion employee could waive his right to a judicial forum 
for his Age Discrimination in Employent Act claim as nothing in the statute precluded such a waiver); 
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (reading Federal Arbitration Act to exclude 
arbitration agreements of transportation employees only, allowing enforcement under the Act for all 
other employee agreements to arbitrate). Any agreement to arbitrate does not bind the administrative 
agencies enforcing the statute, however, so that a claim may still be filed with the appropriate adminis-
trative agency, which may bring suit. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002). 
9. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In two subsequent cases the Court reached the same conclusion with respect 
to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 
(1981 ), and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (involv-
ing a discharge that allegedly violated the employee's constitutional rights). 
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contractual and statutory claims and noted that the union could not waive the indi-
vidual's statutory rights under Title VII. 10 The Court also rejected the notion that 
the employee was bound by an election of remedies. 11 In addition, the Court re-
buffed the employer's argument that the courts should defer to prior arbitration 
awards in considering statutory claims, stating that such awards were admissible 
evidence and courts should decide the appropriate weight to be given to the award 
based on the circumstances of the particular case. 12 
In 1991, the Gilmer Court rejected the nonunion plaintiffs reliance on Gard-
ner-Denver, noting that in the context of collective bargaining agreements, there 
was a "tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a 
concern not applicable to the present case." 13 Post-Gilmer, courts regularly en-
forced agreements to arbitrate statutory claims in the nonunion workplace, but 
only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit required unionized em-
ployees to arbitrate statutory claims over their objections. 14 Based on the circuit 
split, the issue returned to the Supreme Court in Wright v. Universal Maritime 
Service Corp., where the Court held that if a union could waive an employee's 
statutory right to a judicial forum, the "waiver must be clear and unmistakable." 15 
Following Wright, the split between the Fourth Circuit and all others to address 
the issue remained, 16 leading to the grant of certiorari in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett. 11 
The lawsuit in Pyett, which arose out of the Second Circuit, was filed by em-
ployees who were transferred to less desirable jobs and filed grievances with their 
union alleging age discrimination, as well as violations of the seniority and over-
time provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 18 After the union with-
drew the discrimination claims from arbitration, the employees sued and the em-
ployer moved to compel arbitration. 19 The contractual language in Pyett made the 
grievance and arbitration procedure the "sole and exclusive" remedy for discrimi-
nation, including claims under the ADEA and state and local discrimination law.20 
Both the district court and Second Circuit denied the motion to compel on the 
basis of Gardner-Denver, which they read as holding that clauses in a collective 
bargaining agreement, "which purport to waive employees' rights to a federal 
forum with respect to statutory claims, are unenforceable."21 
The Supreme Court's 5-4 decision followed the recent trend of expanding en-
forcement of arbitration agreements of all types. The majority, in an opinion writ-
ten by Justice Thomas, found no barrier to union waiver of employees' rights to a 
10. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52. 
11. Id. at 49-50. 
12. Id. at 59-60. 
13. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35. 
14. See, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996); Safrit 
v. Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d 306 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). 
15. 525 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1998). 
16. Compare Cone Mills Corp., 248 F.3d at 308 (finding waiver), with Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 
185 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding no waiver permissible and rejecting Fourth Circuit's analy-
sis as "unsound"). 
17. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 552 U.S. 1178 (2008). 
18. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1462 (2009). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 146 I. For the precise language of the contract, see infra note 99. 
21. Pyett v. Pa. Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d at 93-94 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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judicial forum for statutory claims, basing this conclusion on both the union's 
broad authority to negotiate, limited only by the duty of fair representation, and 
the absence of any restriction on such authority in the ADEA. 22 The Court did not 
read Gardner-Denver as precluding a waiver, but rather as holding that there was 
no waiver (or preclusion) in that case because the collective bargaining agreement 
did not cover statutory claims.23 The opinion suggests that any concern for con-
flict of interests between the individual employee and the collective, the grounds 
on which Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver, is a matter for Congress and, 
additionally, "proves too much" for the emphasis on collective interests is the 
premise of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).24 Further, the Court indi-
cated that the duty of fair re~resentation protects individuals whose interests may 
be at odds with the majority. 5 
As for the waiver itself, because the employees had "acknowledged" in the 
courts below that the contractual provision was "sufficiently explicit" to preclude 
the lawsuit, the Court refused to consider the argument that the waiver was not 
clear and unmistakable.26 Last but certainly not least, the Court declined to ad-
dress the question of whether a process that allows the union to block arbitration 
of employee statutory claims would constitute an impermissible substantive waiv-
er of those claims.27 
The dissent's criticism of the majority was stinging. Justice Stevens stated 
that the majority had simply "reexamin[ed) the statutory questions resolved in 
Gardner-Denver through the lens of the policy favoring arbitration,"28 further 
noting that "the majority's preference for arbitration again leads it to disregard our 
precedent."29 Justice Souter's dissent also criticized the majority for abandoning 
precedent.30 Justice Souter variously characterizes the decision as "misread[ing]" 
Gardner-Denver, reaching conclusions "impossible to square" with Gardner-
Denver, ignoring Gardner-Denver, and "diminish[ing] [its] reasoning, and ... 
holding."31 
The decision in Pyett is open to criticism on many grounds, not the least of 
which is its disregard of stare decisis. The Court shows a remarkable lack of un-
derstanding of the realities of labor relations and labor Jaw, despite briefing by 
experienced labor attorneys and amicus briefs filed by the National Academy of 
Arbitrators, the AFL-CIO, Change to Win, and the Service Employees Interna-
tional Union. 32 This lack of understanding is most fundamentally illustrated by 
22. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465. 
23. See id. at 1468. 
24. Id. at 1472. 
25. See id. at 1473 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)). 
26. Id. at 1473. 
27. Id. at 1474. 
28. Id. at 1475 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
29. Id. at 1475. 
30. Id. at 1476-77 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
31. Id. at 1479, 1480. 
32. While the employer was represented by experienced labor attorneys and other employer organi-
zations also filed briefs, their interests in limiting employees to the arbitral forum did not provide an 
incentive to educate the court on the aspects of labor relations unfavorable to that argument. 
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the failure to distinguish labor arbitration from arbitration of statutory claims.33 
Additionally, the Court blithely suggests that such a waiver is a mandatory subject 
of bargaining, without recognition of many cases holding that waivers of rights 
are not mandatory subjects. 34 Further, the opinion assumes that the duty of fair 
representation will protect employees in the event of conflicts of interest between 
the individual and the collective, an issue that has pervaded the opinions of courts 
and commentators rejecting the Pyett view.35 The Court's decision relies on the 
lack of any statutory language precluding collectively bargained waivers of judi-
cial forums, ignoring the fact that Gardner-Denver was widely read as precluding 
such waivers. What would prompt Congress to include such a provision in a sta-
tute when there was no reason to believe that a waiver was permissible under ex-
isting law? While much more could be said about each of these criticisms of the 
decision, the focus of this symposium is creeping legalism in arbitration. What 
impact will Pyett and the fallout from Pyett have on the arbitration process? Most 
relevant to that discussion are the criticisms regarding the Court's failure to appre-
ciate and take into account the realities of labor relations and labor arbitration. 
Those will be explored further after a discussion of creeping legalism. 
33. For a thorough discussion of the differences between labor arbitration and employment arbitra-
tion and the Pyett Court's failure to appreciate the distinction, see Martin H. Malin, The Evolving 
Schizophrenic Nature of Labor Arbitration, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 58 (2010). 
34. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1464; see Ann C. Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Unionized 
Workplace: ls Bargaining with the Union Required?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON OISP. RESOL. 513, 526-39 
(2001) (and cases cited therein). Cf Utility Vault Co., 345 N.L.R.B. 79 (2005) (where the NLRB found 
unilateral imposition of a dispute resolution program for statutory claims violated the statute). For 
further discussion of this issue see infra note I 28. 
35. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (noting the "potential 
disparity in interests between a union and an employee" and "the "tension between collective represen-
tation and individual statutory rights"); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291-92 
(1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981) (discussing unions' 
difficulty in balancing individual and collective interests in the FLSA context); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974) ("In arbitration ... the interests of the individual employee 
may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit."); NLRB v. 
Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 327 (1974) (Stewart, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing 
unions' conflicting interests in the context of employees' Section 7 NLRA rights); Plumley v. S. Con-
tainer, 303 F.3d 364, 374 (I st Cir. 2002) ("If unions were so empowered, the rights of a minority (each 
individual union member) would be subject to the will of the majority"); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 
109 F.3d 354, 362-64 (7th 1997); Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 524-26 
(I Ith Cir. 1997); Varner v. Nat'l Super Mkts. Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996); Randolph v. 
Cooper Indus., 879 F. Supp. 518, 521 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that "[n]othing in Gilmer suggests that 
the Court abandoned its concern about the inherent conflicts between group goals and individual right.~ 
that exist in the give-and-take of the collective bargaining process"); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Labor 
Arbitration, EEOC Conciliation, and Discrimination in Employment, 24 ARB. J. 88, 95-99 (1969) 
(discussing the subordination of civil rights interests in arbitration under collective bargaining agree-
ments); Ann C. Hodges, Protecting Unionized Employees Against Discrimination: The Fourth Cir-
cuit's Misinterpretation of Supreme Court Precedent, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 123, 144-46 (1998) 
(discussing the inadequacies of the duty of fair representation in protecting employees in this context); 
Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 77, 84 
(1996); Janet McEneaney, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in a Union Setting: History, Controversy 
and a Simpler Solution, 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 137, 158-162 (1997); Ronald Turner, Employ-
ment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration, and the Case Against Union Waiver of the 
Individual Worker's Statutory Right to Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY L.J. 135, 187-191 (2000); See 
generally, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); 
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); 
Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Fireman & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). 
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II. CREEPING LEGALISM IN ARBITRATION 
Labor arbitration has been hailed as a triumph of American labor relations. 
Disputes between employers and unions are resolved through the grievance and 
arbitration procedure embodied in almost all labor agreements, rather than through 
litigation, or more importantly, through the exercise of economic power. The 
Steelworkers Trilogy, an exaltation of labor arbitration by the Supreme Court, 
described the process thus: 
[A]rbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of la-
bor disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordi-
nary commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbi-
tration of commercial agreements has no place here. For arbitration of 
labor disputes under collective bargainin~ agreements is part and parcel 
of the collective bargaining process itself. 6 
Indeed, the link between arbitration and industrial strife is so strong that if a 
collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration provision, the courts will 
presume that the union has agreed not to strike during the term of the contract 
even if there is no such provision in the agreement.37 To preserve the right to 
strike, which is a statutorily guaranteed right,38 the union must obtain an express 
contractual provision to that effect. 39 
Critics have been decrying creeping legalism in labor arbitration almost since 
its inception. While the early days of labor arbitration in the United States en-
compassed wide variation in the process, the American system of labor arbitra-
tion, encouraged by the War Labor Board during World War II, largely adopted a 
judicial form. 40 Given the widespread choice of the judicial model over the me-
diatorial model of arbitration, perhaps the creeping legalism should not be a sur-
prise. The source, and to some extent the nature of legalism has changed, howev-
er, since the early criticism began. Initially, the concern was primarily about the 
adoption of more legalistic procedures-transcripts, evidentiary objections, formal 
examination and cross-examination of witnesses, and post-hearing briefs.41 Ac-
cording to the critics, these accoutrements of court formalized an essentially in-
formal procedure, adding complexity and lengthening the proceedings, thereby 
36. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). 
37. Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105-06 (1962). 
38. 29 u.s.c. § 163 (2006). 
39. E.H. Schopler, Collective Bargaining Agreement as Restricting Right to Strike or Picket, 2 
A.L.R.2d 1278 ("As a general proposition, the right to strike and picket, though otherwise recognized, 
cannot be exercised during the life of a valid collective labor agreement which fails by its terms to 
preserve such rights."). 
40. Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Maturing Years, 35 FLA. 
L. REV. 557, 575-76 (1983). For further discussion of the history of labor arbitration in the United 
States, see Dennis R. Nolan & Roger I. Abrams, American Labor Arbitration: The Early Years, 35 
FLA. L. REV. 373 (1983). 
41. See, e.g., John F. Sembower, Halting the Trend Toward Technicalities in Arbitration, JO PROC. 
NAT'LACAD. ARB. 98, 100-105 (1957); Clare B. McDermott, The Presidential Address-An Exercise 
in Dialectic: Should Arbitration Behave as Does Litigation, 33 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. I, 10-18 
( 1981 ); George Nicolau, Can The Labor Arbitration Process Be Simplified? If So, in What Manner and 
at What Expense?, 38 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 69, 70, 72, 81, 82, 83 (1986). 
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threatening to eliminate some of the benefits of arbitration.42 Additionally, these 
procedures made arbitration less accessible to the average working person and 
made it more difficult for the parties to arbitrate without expensive legal counsel.43 
In recent years, another source of creeping legalism has emerged. Both Con-
gress and state legislatures have enacted increasing numbers of statutory provi-
sions relating to lhe workplace.44 These statutory requirements, unlike earlier 
laws that typically provided minimum benefits that could be expanded in collec-
tive bargaining, layered additional legal requirements onto collectively bargained 
terms and conditions of employment. These new laws often intertwined with 
contractual provisions, leaving the possibility, if not the likelihood, of legal argu-
ments in traditional contractual arbitration. For example, a claim that an em-
ployee was discharged or disciplined without just cause might also allege that the 
action violated discrimination laws45 or the anti-retaliation provisions of a law 
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)46 or the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA).47 Similarly, a denial of promotion might 
allege violation of both contractual seniority requirements and discrimination 
law.48 A discharge for absenteeism might also claim violation of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) because that law privileged some of the absences.49 
The addition of these legal issues has contributed to the escalation in the use of 
attorneys and the adoption of judicial-like procedures in arbitration. 
The growing legislation relating to employment led to a debate among arbi-
trators about the role of external law in arbitration. Three primary positions 
emerged, identified with leading proponents, all members of the National Acade-
my of Arbitrators. Bernard Meltzer's view was that the role of the arbitrator, and 
indeed the arbitrator's special expertise, was to interpret the contract not the law. 50 
If the contract and the law conflicted, the arbitrator should interpret the contract as 
written and leave the parties to seek judicial resolution of the legal issue.51 Robert 
Howlett, on the other hand, suggested that contracts must be read in light of the 
42. G. Allen Dash, Discussion, 10 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 106, 108-111 (1957); Sembower, supra 
note 41, at 98-99; McDermott, supra note 41, at 10-18; Arnold M. Zack, Suggested New Approaches 
to Grievance Arbitration, 30 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 105, I 08 (1977). 
43. Leonard Woodcock, Problem Areas in Arbitration, 12 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 90, 92, 95-96 
(1959); Da~h. supra note 42, at I 09. 
44. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 145 (2d ed. 2006); THE 
DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT 
125-26 (U.S. Dept. of Labor & U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr. 
cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi ?article= I 279&context=key _workplace. 
45. See Winn Newman, Post-Gardner-Denver Developments in the Arbitration of Discrimination 
Claims, 28 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 36, 52 (1975) (noting the large number of discharge, discipline 
and layoff grievances involving claims of discrimination and quoting the president of the American 
Arbitration Association to that effect). 
46. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(l) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against employees for exercising their 
rights under OSHA). 
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination for exercising rights under ERISA or under 
any employee benefit plan, as well as discrimination to prevent attainment of plan benefits). 
48. Newman, supra note 45, at 52. 
49. Martin H. Malin, Revisiting the Meltzer-Howlett Debate on External Lnw in Labor Arbitration: 
Is It Time for Courts to Declare Howlett the Winner?, 24 LAB. LAW. I, 25-26 (2008). 
50. Bernard Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and Lnbor Arbitration, 20 PROC. NAT'L 
ACAD.ARB. I, 16(1967). 
51. Id. at 16-17. 
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law since an illegal contract has always been unenforceable, and he read the con-
tract as implicitly incorporating existing law.52 Thus, the arbitrator should consid-
er the law as well as the contract where the law is implicated by the contract pro-
visions at issue.53 Richard Mittenthal took the middle ground.54 To Mittenthal, 
the real issue arose with a conflict between the law and the agreement. 55 He ar-
gued that an arbitrator should not order an employer to violate the law but sug-
gested that such a decision was in fact a construction of the contract, not the law.56 
An arbitrator's award could, however, permit unlawful conduct if permitted by the 
contract.57 Michael Sovern argued for a slightly different intermediate approach.58 
Sovern suggested that an arbitrator could follow the law instead of the contract in 
circumstances where the arbitrator is qualified to interpret the law, the legal ques-
tion is implicated in the contractual dispute, the law immunizes or requires con-
duct that violates the contract, and the courts do not have primary jurisdiction to 
decide the dispute.59 
In many cases where the law is implicated by the contract, however, the ex-
treme situation that led to the Meltzer/Howlett debate is not present. Where the 
parties expressly authorize the arbitrator to consider the law, either in the contract 
or the arbitration submission, virtually all agree that the arbitrator should follow 
the parties' direction.60 
At the time of the initial Meltzer/Howlett debate, many of the current laws 
that may affect the subjects covered by collective bargaining agreements had yet 
to be enacted. While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act61 and the ADEA62 had re-
cently taken effect, OSHA,63 ERISA,64 FMLA,65 the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA),66 the Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),67 
52. Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, 20 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 67, 
83 (1967). 
53. Id. at 83-88. 
54. Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, 21 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 42 (1968). 
55. Id. at 46-47. 
56. Id. at 48-49. 
57. Id. at 50. 
58. Michael Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law?, 23 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 
29 (1970). 
59. Id. at 38. 
60. Id. at 30. 
61. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006)). 
62. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202 (codified as amended in 29 
u.s.c. §§ 621-634 (2006)). 
63. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596 (codified as amended in 29 
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006)). 
64. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406 (codified as amended in 
various sections of 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
65. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3 (codified as amended in 5 U.S.C. §§6381-
6387 (2006), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2154 (2006)). 
66. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 (codified as amended in 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006)). 
67. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.(2006)). 
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and most recently, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA),68 not 
to mention a multitude of state laws, have since magnified the intersections of law 
and contract.69 In 1980, a distinguished group of arbitrators, judges, and attorneys 
studied the decisional process in arbitration and addressed the issues of external 
law, particularly in light of the decision in Gardner-Denver, which had reignited 
the debate.70 This group's report slated: 
The arbitrator may have no choice [about dealing with external law] if 
the agreement specifically includes references to relevant statutes. But 
barring such provisions, our view is that arbitrators should limit them-
selves to the task specified by the arbitration clause-the interpretation 
and application of the agreement. This conforms to the parties' intent. It 
also reaffirms the essential holding of the Trilogy which emphasized the 
arbitrator's expertise in industrial relations and the law of the shop. It al-
so recognizes that many arbitrators are not lawyers and have no special 
competence in interpreting federal statutes and court decisions. 
But even though most arbitrators try to stay aloof from external law, the 
decisional process has been substantially affected by such cases as Gard-
ner-Denver . ... 71 
The study panel went on to recommend that arbitrators and parties try to in-
sure finality of arbitration by keeping in mind the guidance from the courts in 
cases such as Gardner-Denver.72 The Court there suggested that a court in subse-
quent litigation could give great weight to an arbitral decision where the statutory 
issue was essentially coextensive with the contractual one, the arbitration was 
procedurally fair with an adequate record relating to the statutory issue, and the 
arbitrator was competent to decide it.73 According to the expert panel, if the par-
ties and the arbitrator in cases involving overlap of statutory and contractual 
claims followed this guidance, the decision of the arbitrator would be more likely 
to be final, but they acknowledged that formality in arbitration would increase as a 
result.74 
Professor Malin recently argued that in light of subsequent developments, the 
debate about external law in arbitration has been effectively resolved.75 Malin 
offered three reasons that courts should enforce arbitration awards based on the 
law alone. First, at the time the article was written, a minority of courts were 
68. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233 (codified a~ amended 
in 26 U.S.C. § 9834 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 300qq-53, 1320d-9, 2000ff-2000ff-l I (2006)) (prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of genetic information with respect to health insurance and employment). 
69. Other statutes that may overlap with collective bargaining agreements include the Worker Ad-
justment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-379 (codified as amended in 29 
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (2006)), and the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
347 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (2006)). 
70. Alex Elson et al., Decisional Thinking, 32 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 62, 68 (1980). 
71. Id. (footnote omitted). 
72. Id. at 69. 
73. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21 (1974). 
74. Elson, supra note 70, at 69. 
75. Malin, supra note 49, at 26. 
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requmng arbitration of legal claims under collective bargaining agreements.76 
Second, courts are increasingly giving great weight to the awards of labor arbitra-
tors in subsequent litigation based on related legal claims.77 And third, the FMLA 
must be considered by labor arbitrators deciding absenteeism cases, which often 
tum on whether absences are privileged by the statute.78 Accordingly, arbitrators 
should consider legal issues and courts should enforce awards based solely on the 
law, contrary to the statement in the Steelworkers Trilogy that an award based on 
the law alone, rather than the contract, was not enforceable as it did not draw its 
essence from the agreement.79 
The decision in Pyett has added weight to Professor Malin's first point; 
agreements to arbitrate legal claims are now clearly enforceable. What does this 
mean for creeping legalism in arbitration? Perhaps legalism will no longer be 
creeping but instead leaping into arbitration. As the previously discussed authori-
ties and many others80 have pointed out, the growing number of legal claims that 
overlap with contractual claims has forced arbitrators to decide how to treat the 
law. To the extent that the law is considered at all, it increases legalism, both 
substantive and procedural. The parties to an arbitration with legal implications 
will be more inclined to use lawyers to arbitrate. Lawyers are more comfortable 
with the trappings of litigation, and their involvement alone is likely to increase 
the use of legal procedures, such as evidentiary objections. Lawyers will also 
make legal arguments drawn from other settings, that the exclusionary rule should 
prohibit use of evidence after improper searches, for example, or that the accused 
employee is entitled to confront his or her accuser. 81 The increase in legal argu-
ments may encourage the parties to rely more often on arbitrators with legal ex-
pertise. 
Further, as noted above, Gardner-Denver left open the possibility of a subse-
quent legal action based on the same or related facts. Accordingly, the incentives 
to use a lawyer, require a transcript, limit evidence with objections, and other 
trappings of litigation were enhanced even prior to Pyett, at least for the employer. 
At minimum, the employer would want to prevail with an arbitral opinion that 
would enable it to obtain summary judgment based on the decision in any legal 
claim filed. 82 It is clear from court decisions, however, that in some cases, unions 
failed to assert legal claims in arbitration despite the fact that the employees made 
such claims.83 It is not clear whether unions were attempting to preserve such 
claims for later litigation or whether there is some other explanation. Where there 
is clearly no waiver, as was commonly the case prior to Pyett, there is an incentive 
for the union to keep those cases where individual legal claims predominate out of 
76. Id. at 14. 
77. Id. at 14-15. 
78. Id. at 15, 25-26. 
79. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). 
80. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 45, at 37, 45-52; Harry T. Edwards, Arbitration of Employment 
Discrimination Cases: A Proposal for Employer and Union Representatives, 27 LAB. L.J. 265, 267-68 
(1976). 
81. See Elson et al., supra note 70, at 64-65 (1980). 
82. See infra notes 195, 200-223 and accompanying text. 
83. See, e.g., Moore v. Duke Power, 971 F. Supp. 978, 984-85 (W.D.N.C. 1997) (finding union's 
failure or refusal to raise disability discrimination claim in arbitration did not permit plaintiff to sue on 
the claim). 
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arbitration to preserve the employee's right to litigate.84 If the employee has con-
sulted an attorney, the attorney may well advise the employee to litigate rather 
than arbitrate. Legal remedies will typically be greater and a jury trial available. 
If the case does not involve an important contractual issue, an employee who 
hires a private attorney to litigate a legal claim preserves union funds for arbitra-
tion of issues deemed more central to the union's representational function. Addi-
tionally, it offers the employee the opportunity to control the arguments and focus 
on legal rather than contractual claims, as opposed to arbitration, which is con-
trolled by the union with contractual issues generally paramount. In Wright v. 
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp.,85 for example, the union recommended to the 
employee that he file a legal claim in his Americans with Disabilities Act case. 
Thus, in some ways, the Gardner-Denver rule may have reduced the number of 
legal claims in arbitration, thereby slowing the trend toward legalization. Now 
that Pyett has changed the landscape, what are the implications for the arbitration 
process? 
Ill. THE IMPACT OF PYEIT 
Pyett's effect on the arbitration process will depend in large part on actions 
taken by employers, unions, and employees in response to the decision.86 The 
task of predicting those reactions, however, is significantly complicated by the 
questions left open in the decision and the uncertainties resulting from it. The key 
factor in determining how many legal claims arise in arbitration may be one that 
Pyett left unresolved: What happens if the union controls the decision of whether 
to arbitrate and declines to do so? Justice Souter suggested that: 
[o]n one level, the majority opinion may have little effect, for it explicitly 
reserves the question whether a CBA's waiver of a judicial forum is en-
forceable when the union controls access to and presentation of em-
ployees' claims in arbitration, ... which is usually the case.87 
Unquestionably, the failure to decide this issue will lead to continued litiga-
tion. If the ultimate result, or the widespread response of the lower courts faced 
with the issue, is that employees can proceed in court when the union declines to 
arbitrate,88 then the impact on legalism in arbitration will be limited. Unions and 
84. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
85. 525 U.S. 70, 74 (1998); see also Safrit v. Cone Mills, 248 F.3d 306, 307-08 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(finding a waiver, although the union urged the employee to pursue legal remedies and did not file a 
grievance on her claim of violation of a prior settlement reached in the grievance process). 
86. Although Pyett was a private sector case, public sector employers have a~serted it in support of 
their waiver arguments also. See, e.g., Catrina v. Ocean City, No. WMN-09-505, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
59783, at *10-*13 (D. Md. July 14, 2009) (finding no waiver because the collective bargaining agree-
ment mandated arbitration of contractual discrimination claims only, and not those based on discrimi-
nation statutes), vacated, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 95599 (D. Md. Oct. 14, 2009) (on other grounds). 
87. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1481 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
88. See, e.g., Kravar v. Triangle Servs., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-07858-RJH, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 42944, 
at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009). 
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employees desirous of preserving the right to litigate can achieve that result with a 
union decision not to arbitrate the legal claim. 
A final resolution of that sort, however, seems at odds with the Supreme 
Court's strong preference for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. 89 The 
Fourth Circuit, which led the way in enforcing collectively bargained agreements 
to arbitrate statutory claims, has not been troubled by the fact that employees 
whose union refuses to arbitrate have no forum for their statutory claims.90 Yet 
complete deprivation of any forum for vindication of statutory rights is not merely 
the change in forum approved by the Supreme Court in enforcing agreements to 
arbitrate statutory claims,91 but instead a deprivation of substantive statutory 
rights.92 Given that the courts have already split on this issue, it will most likely 
return to the Supreme Court for resolution. 
The failure to resolve this question is not the only uncertainty resulting from 
Pyett. The Court has held that any waiver must be clear and unmistakable, yet it 
has not offered a test for determining when that standard is met.93 Additionally, 
there are multiple questions about the application of the dut~ of fair representation 
to union decisions relating to employees' statutory claims. 4 Yet despite the un-
knowns, unions, employers, and employees must negotiate contracts, process 
grievances, decide whether to arbitrate cases, decide whether to litigate claims, 
and decide whether to contest litigation based on collectively bargained arbitration 
provisions. The decisions that they make and the reaction of the courts to those 
decisions will impact legalism in the arbitration process. What provisions will 
employers and unions negotiate, and how will the courts evaluate them if they are 
challenged by employees? How will unions respond when faced with grievances 
that implicate legal claims? Will employees arbitrate legal claims or challenge 
arbitration provisions in court? How will courts respond to arbitration decisions 
urged as persuasive authority in cases where no waiver existed? The following 
sections will analyze these questions and their impact on the process of arbitra-
tion. 
Overlappin~ contractual and statutory claims have been arbitrated regularly 
for many years. 5 While it has been persuasively argued that the increase in legal 
89. See Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1469-71 (describing "radical change" in the Court's view of arbitration 
from hostility to support); James L. Stone & Jonathan Boonin, The Supreme Court's Emerging En-
dorsement of Arbitration, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2001, at 67. 
90. See Safrit, 248 F.3d at 308. 
91. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). 
92. See Green Tree Fin. Servs. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 
(quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637)) (stating that "even claims arising under a statute designed to 
further important social policies may be arbitrated because '"so long as the prospective litigant effec-
tively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,"' the statute serves its 
functions"); Cole v. Bums lnt'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (1997) ("At a minimum, statutory 
rights include both a substantive protection and access to a neutral forum in which to enforce those 
protections."). 
93. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80-81 (1998) 
94. See Hodges, supra note 35, at 155-59; infra notes 115-119, 151-152, 169, 171, 173-174, 195-
196, 210-211, 223-224 and accompanying text. 
95. See Newman, supra note 45, at 45-52, 54; IKO Prods., Inc. v. Pace Int'! Union, Local 823, 118 
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 887 (2003) (lmundo, Arb.) (interpreting FMLA to decide whether employee 
entitled to contractual bonus based on attendance); Mead Prods., Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l 
Union, Local 291, 114 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1753 (2000) (Nathan, Arb.) (interpreting the Americans 
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issues has adversely impacted the institution of labor arbitration,96 and contri-
buted to increasing legalism,97 Pyett will only make a difference if substantial 
additional numbers of employee statutory claims are forced into a contractually 
negotiated grievance procedure or if unions and employers approach the legal 
issues in arbitration differently as a result of Pyett. 
A. The Negotiation of Waivers 
If waivers are rare, Pyett may have little impact on legalism in arbitration. 
The decision in Pyett itself, along with decisions from the Fourth Circuit and sev-
eral post-Pyett district court decisions, demonstrates that there are currently col-
lectively bargained provisions that constitute judicial forum waivers.98 Further, 
Pyett offers clear direction to employers and unions that desire to negotiate waiv-
ers. Parroting the Pyett contract language would almost certainly result in a clear 
and unmistakable waiver.99 In the Fourth Circuit, either an arbitration clause that 
includes statutory claims or incorporation of a statute into an agreement with an 
arbitration provision is sufficient to effectuate a waiver. 100 Neither a general anti-
discrimination requirement nor a clause that mimics the statutory language consti-
tutes a waiver in the Fourth Circuit, however. 101 
with Disabilities Act to decide whether employer violated agreement by allowing disabled employee to 
bump a more senior employee because he could not perform the job of junior employee); Int'! Paper 
Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'! Union, Local 404, 69 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 857 (1977) (Taylor, 
arb.) (considering discrimination laws and executive order to decide whether award of apprenticeship 
to a junior black employee instead of a senior white employee violated the agreement). 
96. See, e.g., David E. Feller, Arbitration: The Days of its Glory are Numbered, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 
97, I 07-10 (1977-78). See also Bonnie L. Siber, The Gardner-Denver Decision: Does it Put Arbitration 
in a Bind?, 25 LAB. L.J. 708, 714-16 (1974) (arguing that Gardner-Denver may increase legalism and 
formalism in arbitration because courts will be reviewing arbitration decisions for admissibility); Judge 
Edwards Defends Use of Arbitration as Better Means to Settle Labor Disputes, 107 Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) at A- I (June 3, 1982) (suggesting that judicial review of arbitration decisions may encourage 
arbitrators to write their decisions for the courts to the detriment of the process). 
97. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text. 
98. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465 (2009); Aleman v. Chugach Support 
Servs., 485 F.3d 206, 215-19 (4th Cir. 2007); Safrit v. Cone Mills, 248 F.3d 306, 307-08 (4th Cir. 
2001); Johnson v. Tishman-Speyer Prop., L.P., No. 09-CV-1959, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96464, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009); Borrero v. Ruppert Hous. Co., No. 08-CV-5869, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
52174, at *9-*IO (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009); Moore v. Duke Power Co., 971 F. Supp. 978, 984 
(W,D.N.C. 1997). Borrero and Johnson involved employers who were part of the same multi-
employer bargaining association as 14 Penn Plaza and thus the contract language was identical. The 
other cases all preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Pyett. As indicated infra notes 189-192 and 
accompanying text, Pyett does not directly address what language would be necessary to constitute a 
waiver. It is not clear whether the Fourth Circuit's waiver test will remain the same after Pyett. 
99. The contract language in Pyett stated as follows: 
There shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by reason of race, creed, 
color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any other characteristic pro-
tected by law, including but not limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New 
York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Code, ... or any other similar 
laws, rules or regulations. All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration proce-
dures (Articles V and VI) as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations. Arbitrators shall apply 
appropriate law in rendering decisions based upon claims of discrimination. 
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1461. 
JOO. See Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc. 183 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1999). 
IOI. Id. at 323; Carson v. Giant Food Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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The Pyett decision is likely to prompt more employer efforts to negotiate pro-
visions requiring arbitration of statutory claims. 102 Some attorneys are cautioning 
employers to tread carefully in seeking contractual waivers. 103 The cost of arbi-
trating legal claims will probably be higher than the cost of traditional labor arbi-
tration, particularly if the parties negotiate provisions that allow for some discov-
ery and a broader range of remedies. 104 Further, the employer may have to offer 
some contractual benefit to the union in negotiations to obtain the waiver. rn5 De-
spite the potential for increased costs, however, these waivers are likely to appeal 
to some employers for several reasons. Employers have complained for years 
about systems in which aggrieved employees get two bites at the apple. 106 That is 
most often the case where both a contractual grievance and a statutory lawsuit are 
permissible. While an arbitration provision adopted by a nonunion employer 
might prompt claims that otherwise would not be filed, in the unionized 
workplace incorporating statutory arbitration consolidates two existing claims into 
the arbitral forum. Additionally there is evidence that unionized employees are 
more likely to file legal claims than nonunion employees. 107 Further, the limited 
102. See Gerald C. Peterson, Be Careful What You Wish For: An Analysis of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's Decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 60 LAB. L.J. 137, 144 (2009). Peterson, a manage-
ment attorney, suggests that many employers will welcome the decision because it will allow cheaper, 
quicker resolution of statutory claims. Id.; see also Sarah R. Cole, Let the Grand Experiment Begin: 
Pyett Authorizes Arbitration of Unionized Employees' Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (citing recommendations of various law firms representing em-
ployers advocating inclusion of provisions requiring arbitration of statutory claims in collective bar-
gaining contracts) (copy on file with the author). 
103. See, e.g., Panelists Discuss High Court's Pyett Ruling And Issues Confronting Contract Negotia-
tors, 146 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at B-1 (August 3, 2009) (articulating various concerns for employers 
considering negotiating waivers, including whether liability insurance covers arbitrated claims and the 
absence of summary judgment in arbitration); Peterson, supra note 102, at 145-46 (cautioning employ-
ers about the following potential consequences of negotiating waivers: I. unions may demand substan-
tial concessions in exchange for waivers; 2. unions with contracts containing waivers may seek more 
information relating to discrimination issues; 3. employers may be liable for the opposing party's 
attorneys' fees; 4. employers may feel the need to use attorneys for these arbitrations and to have a 
court reporter; and 5. the costs of arbitration may increase if more complex issues are arbitrated). 
104. See infra notes 153-162 and accompanying text (suggesting that such provisions may be neces-
sary to ensure that courts uphold the arbitration provisions). 
105. If unions put a high price on waivers, employers may decide to forego them. The costs and 
benefits of arbitration are difficult to assess accurately. See Douglas M. Mahony & Hoyt N. Wheeler, 
Adjudication of Workplace Disputes, in LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS 36 I, 378-90 
(Kenneth G. Dau Schmidt et al, eds. 2009); Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Ad-
vantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 421-440 
(2000). Dennis Nolan argues that few employers will find these provisions of sufficient value to offer 
enough to induce unions to sacrifice employee rights, which is not in the interest of unions in any 
event. Dennis R. Nolan, Disputatio: "Creeping Legalism" as a Declension Myth, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 
I. 
106. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 26, 55-56 (1974). 
107. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 44, at 155 (explaining "unionized workers and high wage 
workers are more likely to go to an agency or court than other employees"); Michele Hoyman & La-
mont Stallworth, Suit Filing by Women: An Empirical Analysis, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61, 77 (1986) 
(finding correlation between union activism and filing of lawsuits); Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. 
Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An Empirical Portrait of the litigious Worker, 1981 U. ILL. L. 
REV. I 15, 134-36 (finding that both union activism and grievance filing were positively associated with 
filing of lawsuits and discrimination charges). 
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resources of unions 108 and the inability of some employees to find counseI 109 may 
result in the abandonment of some statutory claims. In these difficult economic 
times, discrimination complaints at the federal and state level have soared, I JO 
which may prompt more employers to consider arbitration to limit judicial actions. 
Also, the recent enactment of the amendments to the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, which reverses several Supreme Court decisions that narrowed the coverage 
of the statute and resulted in an overwhelming win rate for employers,111 and the 
new Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 112 increase the likelihood of 
successful legal claims against employers. 113 Thus, some unionized employers 
108. This is a more likely result if employees are not allowed to pursue their own claims in arbitra-
tion. See infra notes 135-136, 143-147, and accompanying text. 
109. It is difficult for employees to find attorneys for court cases. The limitation to arbitration will 
discourage plaintiffs' attorneys who prefer to litigate before juries with the full range of statutory rights 
and remedies, including awards of attorneys' fees if they prevail. See infra note 152 and accompanying 
text. 
110. EEOC Posts Fiscal 2009 Enforcement Data, 3 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-15, Jan. 7, 2010 
(discussing record number of private sector EEOC charges filed in fiscal 2008, with second highest 
number of charges filed in the last 20 years in fiscal 2009, including record numbers of charges alleg-
ing disability, religious and national origin discrimination); Tresa Baldas, Complaints Flood EEOC, 
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 2009, at I (discussing twenty-eight percent jump in EEOC charges since 2007 and 
also large increases in filings with state discrimination agencies). 
111. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 (2008) (explicitly overturning U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions in order to broaden the term "disability", and thereby increase the number 
and types of persons covered by the Act); Disabilities Discrimination: Employer's Overwhelming Win 
Rate in Disability Suits is Rising, ABA Survey Says, 121 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-2 (June 22, 2000) 
(finding that employers prevailed in 95.7% of all federal Title I ADA cases and that in 1999, zero 
percent of employees bringing Title I ADA cases prevailed in five of the federal circuits); John Parry, 
American Bar Association Survey on Court Rulings Under Title I of Americans with Disabilities Act, 
119 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-1, (June 22, 1998) (finding that employers prevailed in ninety-two 
percent of Title I ADA cases from 1992 to 1998); Amy L. Allbright, 2004 Employment Decisions 
Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update, 29 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 513 (2005) 
(finding plaintiff win rates as follows: 1992-1997: 7.9%; 1998: 5.7%; 1999: 4.3%, 2000: 3.6%, 2001: 
4.3%; 2002: 5.5%; 2003: 2%; 2004: 3%); Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Wind-
fall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (finding that employers had prevailed at the 
trial court level ninety-four percent of the time in Title I ADA cases). 
112. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233 (codified as amended 
in 26 U.S.C. § 9834 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 300qq-53, 1320d-9, 2000ff-2000ff-l I (2009)) (prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of genetic information with respect to health insurance and employment). 
113. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic 
Corp. v. Twombly may make it more difficult for employees to state a claim for discrimination. See 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 1953 (2009) (making clear that Twombly's requirement that a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual information to make a complaint plausible on its face applies 
to all civil cases); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-58 (2007) (holding that com-
plaint must contain factual information that makes allegations more than speculative or suspicious; the 
claim must be plausible); Ageropoulos v. Exide Technologies, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59009 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting a motion to dismiss in a case where the Plaintiff alleged continuous harass-
ment on the basis of his national origin, and provided some examples in the complaint, on the grounds 
that the allegations did not rise to the level of "plausibility" under Iqbal); Erwin Chemerinsky, Moving 
to the Right, Perhaps Sharply to the Right, 12 GREEN BAG 2d 413, 415-16 (2009) (discussing Iqbal as 
the most important case of the term and a significant benefit for defendants by judicially amending 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8 to substitute plausibility pleading for notice pleading). Joseph 
A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 (2009) (discussing impact of Twombly for employment discrimina-
tion claims). It is probable, however, that these cases will create less of a problem for employees in 
unionized workplaces where the union can assist with evidence that will enable the employee to plead 
with sufficient specificity to avoid dismissal. 
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will conclude that the advantages of a statutory arbitration provision are likely to 
. h d" d 114 outwe1g any 1sa vantages. 
Will unions agree to such waivers? There are many reasons that unions 
should be extremely wary of waiving employee statutory rights. Resource limita-
tions will prevent most unions from arbitrating all statutory claims, just as unions 
cannot currently afford to arbitrate all contractual claims. This will be a particu-
larly acute problem in right-to-work states where the union must represent em-
ployees even if they choose not to pay union dues, reducing the resources availa-
ble to the union for arbitration. 115 If the union's decision not to arbitrate deprives 
the employee of a forum to litigate statutory rights, the employee's only recourse 
may be to sue the union for breach of the duty of fair representation. 116 An in-
crease in duty of fair representation litigation will further deplete union resources. 
Although employees must meet a high burden to prove breach of the duty of fair 
representation and, as a result, unions often prevail, 117 litigation of the claims is 
costly for the union and the resulting publicity is undesirable to organizations 
trying to recruit members. 118 If the case that the union declines to arbitrate alleges 
discrimination (the most common claim in cases to date), the union may be faced 
with a discrimination suit in addition to a breach of fair representation action. 119 
114. As Michael Green has persuasively pointed out, arbitration has some disadvantages for employ-
ers. Green, supra note 105. Among the concerns identified are the uncertainty of real cost savings and 
speed, particularly where more court-like procedures are incorporated in arbitration; the costly and 
sometimes successful litigation by employees, and occasionally administrative agencies, initiated to 
challenge arbitration where procedures are not sufficiently protective of statutory rights; and the ab-
sence of summary judgment and the discovery that may be necessary to support a summary judgment 
motion. Id. at 421-40. Green also points out the benefits of litigation for employers, including availa-
bility of summary judgment and discovery, plaintiffs' low win rate, the backlog at the EEOC, and 
plaintiffs' difficulties in obtaining counsel. Id. at 450-60. Employers might seek to negotiate arbitration 
provisions in union contracts that minimize the drawbacks and create some of the advantages present 
in the court system. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
115. Section 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act allows states to enact laws barring unions and 
employers from negotiating union security provisions, which require employees to pay dues and initia-
tion fees to the union. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b)(2006). The union must represent all employees in the bar-
gaining unit, however, even those who choose not to pay for representation, commonly known as free 
riders. James C. Thomas, Right-to-Work: Settled Law or Unfinished Journey, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 
163, 203-04 (2007). Twenty-two states have enacted such laws, known as right to work laws. See 
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Right to Work States, http://www.nrtw.org/ 
rtws.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). 
116. The employee might also sue the union for discrimination or sue in court and challenge the 
arbitration requirement. See infra notes 119, 153-162 and accompanying text. The number of these 
cases may be limited by employees' inability to obtain legal representation, however. See infra note 
152. 
117. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1987) (stating that the union has a "statutory obligation to 
serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discre-
tion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct"); LAURA J. COOPER, ET AL., 
ADR JN THE WORKPLACE 162 (2005) (noting review of duty of fair representation cases from 2000-
2004 shows that employees file many cases but few are successful); Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and 
the Transformation of American Labor Unions, 69 Mo. L. REV. 365, 432 (2004) (indicating unions are 
rarely found liable in duty of fair representation cases because of the substantial deference to their 
decisions). 
118. Nicolau, supra note 41, at 89 (discussing the cost of duty of fair representation litigation and the 
potentially devastating cost of losing such a case). 
119. The discrimination statutes impose liability for discrimination on unions as well as employers. 
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (2006); The Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 623(c) (2006); The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
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Arbitration of statutory claims will make greater demands on union resources 
than arbitration of contractual claims because union officials, who often represent 
the union in arbitration, are not trained in statutory interpretation or litigation. 
Therefore, unions will need to provide additional training to union officials in-
volved in the grievance and arbitration procedure and to use lawyers more fre-
quently in arbitration, adding to the costs. The more complex issues in some legal 
claims will require longer arbitrations, adding to the cost for the arbitrator and any 
legal representation. Furthermore, agreements to arbitrate will deprive employees 
of statutory rights to jury trials and, depending on the arbitration provision nego-
tiated, perhaps to discovery essential to prove the case, statutory damages, attor-
neys' fees, extended statutes of limitations, and other statutory benefits. 
Unions can be advocates of employee rights without depriving employees of 
their right to litigate. Where there is an overlap between contractual and statutory 
rights, unions can continue to arbitrate where arbitration provides an effective 
forum and the case fits with bargaining unit priorities for arbitration. But where 
statutory issues predominate or where the complexity of the case requires substan-
tial legal expertise, a legal forum can be used. 120 Unions regularly assist em-
ployees in litigation of statutory claims, sometimes providing counsel and other 
times support in the form of gathering and providing evidence and persuading 
witnesses to testify. 
Despite the persuasive reasons to avoid a waiver, however, they may prove 
hard for unions to resist. If employers desire such provisions, they may be willing 
to offer incentives such as wage and benefit increases to obtain them. To the em-
ployees, a current increase in wages or benefits may have greater appeal than 
waiver of a forum for future claims that may not arise. Empirical evidence sug-
gests that employees do not understand the law relating to employment termina-
tion, consistently overestimating the legal protection that exists. 121 While one 
might expect that experience in the workplace, parJ:icularly the unionized 
workplace, 122 might correct these misperceptions, the data do not support that 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2006); Genetic Infonnation Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000ff-3, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 204 (2008). 
120. Even an optional arbitration procedure for statutory claims could aid employees without depriv-
ing those who desired to do so of the right to litigate. See further discussion of the optional procedure 
infra notes 175-177 and accompanying text. See also Newman, supra note 45, at 36-37, 38-41 (sug-
gesting that arbitration can be an effective forum for discrimination claims because an arbitrator is 
closer to the problem and can create a more effective and quicker resolution for discrimination claims 
where empowered to do so by the union and employer). Newman also points out, however, that arbi-
trators must have legal expertise and apply the law, in addition to being sensitive to discrimination 
issues, in order to be effective. Id. at 47-51. 
121. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning and Law: Exploring the Influences on Workers' Legal 
Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 456-63 (discussing survey results showing high percentages of 
employees in Missouri, New York, and California misunderstood and overestimated the legal protec-
tion relating to employment tennination); Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't Hurt Them: 
Defending Employment-at-Will in light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just Cause 
Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 326 (2002) (replicating Kim's results with surveys in 
Nebraska and Virginia). Employees who overestimate the legal protections from employment tennina-
tion may underestimate the probability of tennination. 
122. The hypothesis is that employees in the unionized workplace, where just cause protection is one 
of the negotiated benefits, would understand that the protection is not provided by law. Kim, supra 
note 121,at475. 
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assumption. 123 Even more relevant to the current discussion, employees also 
overwhelmingly underestimated the effectiveness of a waiver of rights, believing 
that discharge was unlawful despite a waiver of protection. 124 In addition to fail-
ing to understand the existing legal protections and the effect of waivers, em-
ployees may discount the probability that they will suffer from employer conduct 
that requires a legal action on their part, or undervalue the right to litigate legal 
claims.125 It may be difficult for union leaders to convince employees to value the 
right to litigate. 126 Accordingly, popularly elected union leaders who must re-
spond to the desires of their membership may sacrifice the right to litigate to ob-
tain benefits that the membership values more at contract time. 127 
If employers value the waiver, they may insist on it to impasse.128 Even if 
employees value their right to go to court, will they strike over it? Will they hold 
up a contract settlement to obtain it? The prospect seems unlikely even in good 
economic times, much less today's troubled economy. Therefore, it is probable 
that more collective bargaining agreements than in the past will incorporate arbi-
tration of statutory claims. The effect of this increase on legalism in arbitration 
depends on further variables, however, which are discussed in the following sec-
tions. 
123. Id. at473-76. 
124. Id. at 465. 
125. See Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 240-44 (2001) 
(describing the human behavioral characteristics of risk optimism, lack of foresight regarding the value 
of lost benefits, and "editing out" consequences that they view as having a low probability, even if the 
consequences of occurrence are disa~trous); Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happened on the 
Way to the (Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REV. 591, 620 (indicating that "judgmental bias" will 
cause employees to disregard or underestimate the possibility that they will suffer harm that will re-
quire litigation against the employer). 
126. If indeed the leaders understand its value. Cf Sunstein, supra note 125, at 264-65 (suggesting 
that unions may not have the problems of individual employees in evaluating waivers). The buyer's 
remorse will come later when an employee with a legal claim seeks advice from an attorney and the 
reality of the foregone legal protections such as a jury trial and punitive damages sinks in. Cf. Keith N. 
Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. Cf. ECON. 
REV. 209, 252-53 (2000) (suggesting that agreements to arbitrate in the absence of accurate information 
may be rational and not detrimental to employees over time). If Professor Hylton is correct, we may 
see more of these agreements, but that may not alter the significant possibility that some individual 
employees will sue the union for breach of duty of fair representation based on buyer's remorse, par-
ticularly those employees whose claims are undervalued by the union's decision. Id. at 255-56. 
127. The law mandates regular election of union officials. See 29 U.S.C. § 481 (2006) (requiring 
elections of national and international union officers at least every five years by secret ballot or at a 
convention with delegates elected by secret ballot, and for local officers, at least every three years, by 
secret ballot). 
128. Justice Thomas' opinion stated in dicta that the waiver was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1464 (2009). This assumption is supported by the Utility Vault 
decision of the NLRB. Utility Vault Co., 345 N.L.R.B. 79 (2005). In Utility Vault, the NLRB agreed 
with the AL.I that an employer's unilateral imposition of a Dispute Resolution Program that encom-
passed statutory claims violated section 8(a)(5). Id. There is a persuasive argument, however, based on 
NLRA precedent, that because arbitration effects a waiver of a statutory right to a judicial forum, it is 
not a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Hodges, supra note 34, at 515. Even if it is a mandatory 
subject of bargaining, it is probable that unilateral imposition by the employer at impasse would be 
unlawful. Both agreements to arbitrate and waivers require consent, and in the case of a waiver, it must 
be clear and unequivocal. Id. at 539-40. Accordingly, lawful unilateral imposition is precluded but 
frustration of bargaining will still occur if an employer can insist to impasse on inclusion of a waiver. 
Id. 
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B. The Parameters of Arbitration 
If a provision regarding arbitration of statutory claims is negotiated, it will 
probably take one of the following forms: (1) traditional labor arbitration with 
union control of the claim; (2) traditional labor arbitration with employee control 
of the claim; (3) modified traditional labor arbitration; (4) a distinct statutory arbi-
tration procedure; or (5) an employee option. I will discuss each of these in turn, 
analyzing the advantages and problems, as well as the likelihood of adoption by 
the parties, followed by an assessment of the impact on legalism. 
1. Traditional Labor Arbitration 
As in the Pyett contract, statutory claims could be incorporated into the griev-
ance and arbitration procedure used for contractual claims. In the traditional un-
ion contract, decisions about which grievances to arbitrate are controlled by the 
union, or, in some cases, a vote of the membership. 129 The union also decides the 
arbitration strategy, including who represents the union in arbitration, what argu-
ments are made, what witnesses are called, and what evidence is submitted. 130 So 
long as these decisions are not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, the union 
does not violate its duty to the employee. 131 
The traditional arbitration procedure is designed for contract claims. It 
eschews discovery 132 and has a very short statute of limitations for grievances, 
often a few days and rarely more than a month. 133 Claims may be lost if not 
129. See LAURA J. COOPER, ET AL., supra note 117, at 157; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967) 
(recognizing the value of grievance and arbitration system that provides the union with the discretion 
to decide which grievances to pursue to arbitration); Cross v. United Auto Workers, 450 F.3d 844, 847 
(8th Cir. 2006) (finding no breach of the duty where union decided in good faith that it could not win 
grievance and did not arbitrate); Driver v. U.S. Postal Serv., Inc., 328 F.3d 863, 869 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(finding union decision not to arbitrate employee's grievance lawful); Thompson v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 276 F.3d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding union decision not to pursue grievance it believed 
unmeritorious did not breach the duty of fair representation even if the union's judgment was errone-
ous). 
130. See Hodges, supra note 35, at 145-49 and cases cited therein. 
131. See id.; Emmanuel v. Int'I Bhd. Teamsters, 426 F.3d 416, 420-21 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding union 
that declined to interview witnesses recommended by employee and to use strategy suggested by 
employee did not breach duty of fair representation, although information discovered later revealed 
evidentiary support for the employee's strategy); Garrison v. Cassens Transp. Co., 334 F.3d 528, 539-
40 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding tactical decisions of union representative who was in charge of sixty to 
seventy grievances per month did not breach the duty of fair representation, noting that union repre-
sentatives could not be held to the standard of lawyers); Murphy v. Air Transp. Local 501, 123 F. 
Supp. 2d 55, 60-62, 64-65 (D. Conn. 2000) (finding union representative who failed to return phone 
calls, had a double vodka before closing arguments, and made poor tactical decisions did not violate 
the duty of fair representation, noting that he was not a lawyer and should not be compared to one). 
132. The union is entitled under the National Labor Relations Act to information necessary to admi-
nister the collective bargaining agreement and thus may obtain information relevant to a grievance by 
request to the employer. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967). The information availa-
ble has been limited to documents, however, and does not include judicial discovery options such as 
interrogatories and depositions. The NLRB may have to decide whether the duty to furnish information 
encompasses information necessary to arbitrate a statutory claim pursuant to a contractual waiver. 
133. See Collective Bargaining And Contract Clauses, 170 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. 
(BNA) 1401 (collecting sample contract clauses containing time limits on filing grievances); Griev-
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grieved immediately. Additionally, in traditional labor arbitration punitive dam-
ages and attorneys' fees are not ordered except in unusual cases. 134 Accordingly, 
remedies available under many statutory regimes will not be recoverable in labor 
arbitration. 135 
As noted above, resource limitations will preclude unions from arbitrating all 
statutory claims, and failure to arbitrate will lead at least some employees to sue 
the union for either breach of the duty of fair representation, discrimination, or 
both. Also, arbitrating these claims will be costly for the union, which will need 
to train union representatives in the law and to use lawyers more frequently in 
arbitration. This option will be appealing to employers, however, because it will 
limit employee claims more than any of the other options. The shorter statute of 
limitations, lack of discovery, and restrictions on damages as compared to statuto-
ry actions also benefit employers. A reduced statute of limitations will preclude 
employees who miss the statute from asserting claims that would have been timely 
in litigation. The lack of discovery also benefits employers, who need it less often 
than employees to prove their case. 136 The reduced damages and absence of attor-
neys' fees will make arbitration losses less costly for employers. 
There is some evidence, although its validity and significance is debated, that 
employees with legal claims are more likely to prevail in arbitration than in litiga-
tion. 137 Employees are far more successful in arbitration on contractual claims 
than on statutory claims, however. 138 Further, it appears that labor arbitrators are 
more likely to rule in favor of employees than employment arbitrators. 139 Gener-
ally, employees are more likely to obtain a higher award in court than in arbitra-
tion, but the data do not consider cases that settle prior to litigation. 140 Low-wage 
employees may have more opportunities to pursue their claims in arbitration, 
however. 141 The possibility of employees prevailing more often, and the absence 
of summary judgment, which may be one cause of the increase in employee victo-
ries, may make arbitration less appealing to employers. 142 If the employee might 
ance Procedures, 9 Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contracts (BNA) 2101 (noting that most 
contracts contain a time limit for filing grievances somewhere between three days and sixty days). 
134. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 1216-17, 1221-22 (6th ed. 2003). 
135. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act allow 
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination, as well as attorneys' fees, and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act allows liquidated damages and attorneys' fees. 42 U.S.C. § 
198la(a)(I) (2006) (Title VID; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a((a)(2)) (2006) (ADA); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006) 
(ADEA). 
136. See Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 96-100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding discovery 
limitations unconscionable in employee's claim of age discrimination because, although the limitations 
were mutual, they had a more detrimental effect on the employee since employer possessed much of 
the evidence relevant to the claim); Uiurie Leader & Melissa Burger, Let's Get a Vision: Drafting 
Effective Arbitration Agreements in Employment and Effecting Other Safeguards to Insure Equal 
Access to Justice, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 87, 117 (2004). 
137. For a thorough and detailed discussion of the studies and their limitations, see Mahony & Whee-
ler, supra note 105, at 378-90. After reviewing various studies, the authors conclude that employment 
arbitration is less advantageous to employees than litigation. Id. at 385, 390. 
138. Id. at 380. 
139. Id. at 380, 387-90. 
140. Id. at 383-85. 
141. Id. at 385, 390. 
142. See Green, supra note 105, at 448-49, 450-54. 
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have prevailed on a contractual claim arising out of the same facts, however, then 
the employer has lost nothing by agreeing to arbitration. 
2. Employee-controlled Labor Arbitration 
The drive to avoid duty of fair representation claims may influence unions to 
choose another option: allowing employees to arbitrate their statutory claims 
under the contractually negotiated grievance procedure. 143 Traditionally, unions 
have been extremely reluctant to allow employees to arbitrate their own claims for 
several reasons, only one of which will discourage this option for legal claims. 
First, employers agree to arbitration on the condition that unions screen 
claims and decline to process those that lack merit. 144 If unions were to allow 
employees to arbitrate at will, arbitration would be far less appealing to employ-
ers, who would face more claims. As a result, employers might refuse to agree to 
contractual arbitration or exact a greater concession from the union in exchange 
for the arbitration agreement. To the extent that employee arbitration merely 
shifts statutory claims from court to the employer's preferred arbitration forum, 
however, employers should not object to such a provision. 145 And indeed, post-
Pyett, some employers have urged courts to find a waiver based on the employer's 
agreement to allow the employee to arbitrate when the union declines to do so, 
even in the absence of a contractual provision permitting employee arbitration. 146 
The other reason that unions control the decision to arbitrate and the arguments 
put forth is to control interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement and to 
prevent arbitration decisions that adversely affect employees in the bargaining 
unit. 147 To address this concern, the parties could negotiate provisions that allow 
the union to intervene in employee-controlled arbitration to support its interpreta-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement, should it differ from that urged by the 
143. For an argument that unions should consider assigning to employees the right to arbitrate their 
own grievances in many cases, see Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Assignment of Labor Arbitration, 81 ST. 
JOHN'S L. REV. 41 (2007). Rubinstein does not limit his argument to cases involving legal claims and 
suggests that there is no need to protect employers from arbitration by employees since they might well 
be sued by employees in hybrid breach of contract/breach of duty of fair representation claims in cases 
where the union declined to arbitrate, a result likely to be significantly more costly than arbitration. Id. 
at 69-70. 
144. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-93 (1967). 
145. Modification of contract language may be required to permit employee arbitration. See Rubins-
tein, supra note 143, at 44-45 (citing several public sector cases in which courts refused to allow un-
ions to assign arbitration to individual employees where the contract did not expressly allow it). 
146. See Kravar v. Triangle Servs., No. I :06-CY-07858, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 42944, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2009) (holding that arbitration agreement did not allow employee to arbitrate so 
she could not be bound to arbitration of her statutory claim if the union declined to arbitrate, despite 
employer's offer to allow her to arbitrate as an individual). To allow an employer to control the forum 
by agreeing to allow employee arbitration in cases where the union declines to arbitrate is problematic. 
The employer could then choose whether to allow the employee to bring the case in court or whether to 
authorize to arbitration by the employee even if not clearly permitted by the contract, thereby binding 
the employee to arbitrate. The better rule would be to allow employee arbitration only by agreement of 
the employer, employee, and union. 
147. See Rubinstein, supra note 143, at 68-69. 
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employer and employee, or to protect the interests of other employees who might 
be adversely affected by the arbitration decision. 148 
Several other issues require resolution if employees are permitted to arbitrate. 
In the typical labor contract the parties split the cost of the arbitrator. 149 As noted, 
unions cannot arbitrate all statutory claims due to limited resources. Thus, the 
employee arbitration option will be feasible only if the union is not required to pay 
for the arbitrator. 150 The other issue requiring resolution is how to determine 
whether a legal claim is sufficiently implicated to allow individual arbitration. 
This decision might be left to the union or incorporated into the contract. The 
specter of the duty of fair representation hangs over this option as well. Does the 
duty of fair representation limit the union's ability to assign arbitration rights to 
employees? 151 If there are neutral standards for making the decision and the court 
does not view the assignment as violative of the rights of other employees, the 
union should survive a duty of fair representation claim. A secondary question is 
whether the union can choose to arbitrate some cases with legal claims, and defer 
others to the employee without breaching the duty of fair representation? If the 
decision is not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith, it should be upheld, but 
union officers will need training as to the legitimate criteria to be applied, and 
some duty of fair representation claims may result from such decisions. As a 
result, unions might choose an absolute rule, rather than selecting among cases to 
148. Cf Newman, supra note 45, at 56 (suggesting that employees be allowed to use their own coun-
sel at their expense in arbitration of discrimination claims so long as they do not attack the collective 
bargaining agreement or take a position at odds with the union's interpretation of the agreement, with-
out limiting the union's ability to participate in the arbitration as well). Again the duty of fair represen-
tation raises its head, with the potential that employees whose interests are adverse to the union may 
sue the union for breach if it intervenes in opposition to the employee's position. This underscores the 
need for resolution of the many uncertainties resulting from the decision in order to facilitate an effec-
tive response by the parties to collective bargaining agreements and suggest~ another reason for unions 
to avoid negotiation of waivers without resolution of the duty of fair representation issues. 
149. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 134, at 40. 
150. In some nonunion arbitration procedures, the employer pays all or most of the cost of arbitration. 
See Mei L. Bicker, et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8 
(reporting results of employer survey in which half of employers reported that they paid all the costs of 
arbitration and others shared costs, with some of the remainder paying a large portion of the cost or 
paying the costs in the case of employee financial hardship). While this option raises concerns about 
whether the arbitrator may have an incentive to favor the paying employer, Michael H. Leroy & Peter 
Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of 
Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143, 153, 195 (2002), the presence of the union 
may diminish this concern because the arbitrator desirous of repeat business will not want to alienate 
either employer or union. See Cole v. Bums lnt'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1475 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
Charging the cost to employees, however, may invalidate the arbitration agreement. See infra note 158 
and accompanying text. 
151. See, e.g. Anchorage Police Dep't Employees Ass'n. v. Feichtinger, 994 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1999). 
In Feichtinger, the court upheld the lower court's denial of summary judgment on a duty of fair repre-
sentation claim to a union that refused to arbitrate where contract allowed employee to do so. The 
union argued that because the employee could and did arbitrate the case himself, there could be no 
breach. Id. at 382. The court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the union's refusal to 
arbitrate undermined the arbitration process, noting that the employee proceeded pro se because he did 
not have the resources to hire an attorney and also that his case was widely publicized, which may 
have made union representation important to the credibility of his claim. Id. at 383. See also Martin v. 
City of O'Fallon, 670 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (at. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that union could not assign to 
employee the right to arbitrate because the union has the duty to represent employees and employees 
did not choose or authorize the employee as their representative). 
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arbitrate. A bright-line rule leaving to employees all claims that have legal impli-
cations might prevent the union from arbitrating some cases with significant im-
plications for contract interpretation, which could affect other employees in the 
bargaining unit, however. 
One of the benefits of unionization is the institutional knowledge that the un-
ion maintains as a result of years of negotiations and contract administration, 
which can be of great assistance to employees with contractual and legal claims. 
For example, unions will have information about prior disciplinary actions against 
other employees which may help to prove differential treatment. Unions can pro-
vide evidence in their possession, help employees gather evidence, and identify 
relevant witnesses and persuade them to testify. This could be particularly impor-
tant in the traditional grievance procedure which lacks provisions for discovery. 
There is a risk of duty of fair representation allegations if the union provides assis-
tance that is perceived as inequitable, however. The risk counsels uniform treat-
ment of employee claims, yet practical factors, such as the strength of the em-
ployee's case and the importance of the issue to other employees, may call for 
more nuanced decisions on the part of the union. Local union officials, who are 
most often rank-and-file employees, and even international officials, who typical-
ly have significantly more experience in workplace governance but rarely legal 
training, will need either extensive training or legal advice to make such decisions. 
The limitations inherent in the traditional arbitration procedure may lead em-
ployees with counsel 152 to challenge the arbitration requirement in court, whether 
the employee or the union controls the arbitration process. In employment arbitra-
tion in the nonunion workplace, employees have challenged the enforceability of 
arbitration provisions on several grounds. 153 The two most likely to be used to 
challenge collectively bargained provisions requiring arbitration are (I) the 
agreement is unconscionable, or (2) the agreement constitutes an effective waiver 
152. Employee plaintiffs' difficulties in finding legal representation have been widely documented. 
See William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To? 
Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 256, 288 (1994); Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: 
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 58 (1998); Theodore J. 
St. Antoine, The Changing Role of Labor Arbitration, 76 IND. L.J. 83, 91 (2001). The limitations on 
discovery and damages, including attorneys' fees, may create even more problems for employees 
trying to hire attorneys in these cases. Plaintiffs' attorneys have been very active in opposing mandato-
ry arbitration. See Brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dent, Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (No. 99-1235), 2000 WL 1022874; 
Brief for National Employment Lawyers Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Circuit 
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (No. 99-1379), 2000 WL 1376974; Brief for National 
Employment Lawyers Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, EEOC v. Waffle 
House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (No. 99-1823), 2001 WL 603393; Cliff Palefsky, Civil Rights Struggle of 
the 90s: From 'Separate but Equal' to 'Just Another Forum', THE RECORDER, May 1999, at 535 
available at 1999 WLNR 8540737; National Employment Lawyers Association, Advocacy: Forced 
Arbitration, http://www.nela.org/NELNindex.cfm?event=showPage&pg=mandarbitration (describing 
advocacy efforts by largest association of lawyers representing employees to oppose mandatory arbi-
tration, including filing amicus briefs, lobbying for legislation, and serving as a resource for the press). 
153. For discussion of challenges to arbitration, see Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to 
Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 469, 500 (discussing application of unconscionability defense); Leroy & Feuille, supra 
note 150, at 195 (discussing empirical research on impact of cost sharing provisions on enforcement of 
arbitration). Cf Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 
(discussing arbitration agreements in franchise contracts and arguing that truly unfair arbitration provi-
sions are uncommon). 
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of statutory rights. 154 The absence of discovery, 155 the shortened statute of limita-
tions, 156 the limitations on damages and attorneys' fees, 157 and any requirement 
154. In the nonunion workplace, agreements to arbitrate have been invalidated, inter alia, on grounds 
of unconscionability and inability to vindicate statutory rights. See Drahozal, supra note 153, at 705-
06. The courts have used the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and state contract law. See Burton, supra 
note 153, at 483-85. Collective bargaining agreements are enforced under section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act, however. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006); Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 
U.S. 448, 450-51 (1957). It is unclear whether these grounds for invalidating arbitration agreements 
under the FAA will apply if employees go to court to challenge arbitration provisions negotiated by the 
union but covering statutory claims. The Supreme Court has held that the FAA applies to most em-
ployment agreements, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001), but has not directly 
addressed its applicability to collective bargaining agreements, which have a separate statutory provi-
sion governing their enforcement. The Pyett Court implicitly treated the agreement as covered by the 
FAA, however, as the motion to compel arbitration and the interlocutory appeal in the courts below 
were based on the FAA. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1462-63 (2009). The Supreme 
Court has required courts to apply federal law under section 301 for enforcement of collective bargain-
ing agreements in order to insure uniform interpretation of such agreements regardless of the location 
of the employer. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456-57; Local 174 v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 
(I 962). Under the FAA, however, courts look to state law to determine enforceability of arbitration 
agreements on unconscionability grounds. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 
281 (I 995). Empirical studies suggest that different courts reach different conclusions on these issues, 
a result at odds with the goal of uniformity in interpretation of collective bargaining agreements. See 
Leroy & Feuille, supra note 150, at 193-94 (noting differences in enforcement rates by circuit but also 
indicating that it is not clear whether the differences are factual or differences in legal analysis). 
Moreover, unconscionability defenses usually rely in part on the adhesive nature of the contract be-
cause they require both procedural and substantive unconscionability. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony 
lnt'I, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding contract of adhesion, offered on take it or leave it 
basis by powerful party to less powerful party meets requirement of procedural unconscionability). 
Will courts find union-negotiated provisions to be adhesive or otherwise procedurally unconscionable, 
given that the imbalance of power is less significant for union-represented employees? One might 
argue that it is adhesive as to employees but since the union acts as their agent, the union and its offic-
ers are chosen by the employees, and the employees often have input into bargaining demands and the 
right to ratify the agreement, such an argument is likely to fail. Use of the unconscionability defense 
thus appears problematic, leaving the defense of inability to vindicate statutory rights as a more prom-
ising ground for setting aside union-negotiated agreements to arbitrate. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000) (recognizing that substantial arbitration costs could prevent a 
plaintiff from effectively vindicating statutory rights in arbitration). Prior cases finding waivers under 
collective bargaining agreements generally have not addressed the issue of enforceability based on 
grounds of unconscionability or inability to effectively vindicate statutory rights. A rare exception is 
Clarke v. UFI, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). The Clarke court looked at the adequacy of 
arbitral procedures in a case where it granted summary judgment on plaintiffs claims alleging viola-
tions of Title VII and state law on the basis of a prior arbitral decision under a collective bargaining 
agreement. The court applied the law of preclusion and looked at the adequacy of the arbitral proce-
dures before according preclusive effect to the arbitrator's factual findings. Id. at 335-36. In finding the 
procedures adequate, the court noted the five days of hearing with testimony from ten witnesses under 
oath and subject to cross-examination, representation by counsel who filed post-hearing briefs, use of a 
transcript, and evidentiary objections. Id. at 336. Rights of discovery and compulsory process were 
also available. Id. at 335. Further, the plaintiffs apparently did not dispute the fairness or adequacy of 
the arbitration process. Id. at 335. 
155. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 683-85 (Cal. 2000) 
(finding that adequate discovery, although not necessarily the full panoply of discovery, is essential for 
employees to vindicate their statutory rights in arbitration); Fitz v. NCR Corp., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 88, 96-
100 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding discovery limitation unconscionable in employee's claim of age 
discrimination because, although the limitations were mutual, they had a more detrimental effect on the 
employee since the employer possessed much of the evidence relevant to the claim). 
156. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int'!, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding thirty day 
time limit for filing claims unconscionable); Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 894-95 
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding strict one year statute of limitations in arbitration agreement deprived the 
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that the employee pay the cost of the arbitrator, 158 alone or in combination/59 
could form the basis of a successful challenge to the arbitration requirement. 160 If 
the employee is not given a role in selection of the arbitrator, that may provide 
another basis for challenge. 161 A successful legal challenge to the arbitration 
agreement could result in either complete invalidation or severance of the offend-
ing portion while enforcing the remainder of the agreement. 162 This potential for 
legal challenge to arbitration interferes with the primary goals of arbitration--a 
low-cost, speedy, and final determination of the dispute. Further, if the arbitration 
agreement is invalidated, it may prevent achievement of the employer's goal of 
limiting the employee to one forum for all claims. 
employee of continuing violation doctrine for extending limitations period which was available under 
the statute). 
157. See, e.g., Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding 
unconscionable requirement that each party pay own attorneys' fees where underlying claims based on 
Title VII and Virgin l~lands law would allow recovery of attorneys' fees); Alexander, 341 F.3d. at 267 
(finding damage limitations and requirement that employee pay own attorneys' fees unconscionable 
where underlying legal claim would allow greater damages and recovery of attorneys' fees); Paladino 
v. Avnet Computer Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (I Ith Cir. 1998) (refusing to force plaintiff to 
arbitrate Title VII claims under agreement that limited plaintiff to contract damages because it was 
"fundamentally at odds with the purposes of Title VII''). 
158. See Cole v. Bums lnt'I Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that 
employee could not be required to pay cost of arbitrator to vindicate statutory claim and interpreting 
the agreement to require the employer to pay the full cost of arbitration in order to find it enforceable); 
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 663-65 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that if payment of 
arbitration costs would prevent vindication of statutory rights, as it would in many cases of lower paid 
employees, such provisions are unenforceable); Martinez v. Master Prot. Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663, 
670-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding requirement that employee pay arbitration costs substantively 
unconscionable); O'Hare v. Mun. Res. Consultants, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 125-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003) (finding arbitration agreement that required employee to pay half of arbitration costs uncons-
cionable where such costs would not be required to vindicate age discrimination claim under state law 
and further finding that employer's later agreement to cover costs could not make unconscionable 
agreement enforceable). See also Leroy & Feuille, supra note 150, at 191-92 (discussing empirical 
research finding that a significant minority of courts strike down either the cost-sharing provisions in 
arbitration agreements or the entire agreement if it requires cost-sharing). 
159. See Burton, supra note 153, at 499 (noting that most of the cases he studied found unconsciona-
bility based on more than one reason). 
160. Of course, not all courts invalidate arbitration agreements on these grounds but so long as some 
do, the potential for legal challenges is present and such challenges will reduce the savings to employ-
ers from arbitration. See, e.g., Mercuro v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671, 682-83 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002) (finding limitation on discovery permissible, noting that adequate discovery was not the same as 
full discovery that would be available in court). 
161. See, e.g., McMullen v. Meijer, 355 F.3d 485, 494-96 (6th Cir. 2004) (refusing to enforce arbitra-
tion agreement for plaintiffs Title VII claims where employer had exclusive control over the pool of 
potential arbitrators because plaintiff could not effectively vindicate statutory rights, remanding for a 
determination as to whether the provision could be severed to render the remainder of the agreement 
enforceable); Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678-79 (finding the plaintiffs inability to participate in the 
selection of the arbitrator to be a factor in finding substantive unconscionability). 
162. Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 105, at 373; Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683-4 (stating, 
"When a court finds a contract unconscionable or illegal it has several options. It may refuse to enforce 
the contract; it may sever the offending clause; or it may limit the application of the offending clause 
so as to avoid the unconscionable or illegal result. As a general rule, if the central purpose of the con-
tract is "'permeated"' or '"tainted'" with unconscionability or illegality then the contract as a whole 
cannot be enforced. If, on the other hand, the unconscionability or illegality is collateral to the main 
purpose of the contract, and the offending provisions can be excised from the contract by means of 
severance or limitation, then the remainder of the contract can be enforced." (citations omitted)). 
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3. Modification of the Traditional Grievance Procedure 
To avoid invalidation of the traditional arbitration procedure, the parties could 
agree to modify the procedure when applied to statutory claims. Such a modifica-
tion would create a dual-track procedure, one track for contract-based claims and 
one for statutory claims. The latter could allow employee control of the grievance 
and provide some of the protections of the statutes, such as discovery and the 
potential for attorneys' fees awards. 163 There is very little difference between this 
alternative and negotiation of a separate procedure for statutory claims. There-
fore, the issues relating to this option will be fully discussed in the following sec-
tion. 
4. Negotiating an Alternative Procedure for Legal Claims 
The differences between labor arbitration and statutory litigation suggest 
another approach to arbitration of statutory claims. The union and employer could 
negotiate a separate arbitration procedure for statutory claims. Negotiation of a 
distinct and tailored procedure could eliminate some of the problems resulting 
from forcing statutory claims into a procedure not designed for their resolution. 164 
An alternative procedure could address the statute of limitations problem, apply-
ing the statutory limitations rather than the much shorter grievance limitations. 
The parties could negotiate discovery provisions to insure that employees are not 
disadvantaged in proving their claims by the absence of discovery. At the parties' 
option, discovery could be more limited than in litigation to reduce costs and 
speed the process. Additionally the alternate procedure could expressly authorize 
arbitrators to provide for statutory damages. There are many models in the non-
union workplace for statutory arbitration procedures, 165 and the Due Process Pro-
tocol 166 includes the basic elements of a fair procedure, providing a template for 
163. For a proposal for a modified arbitration procedure for discrimination claims, including proposed 
contract language, see Newman, supra note 45, at 56-58. 
164. After the Gardner-Denver decision, Judge Harry Edwards, then a law professor, suggested that 
unions and employers negotiate procedures for arbitration of certain discrimination cases which in-
volved individual claims that the "company allegedly violated the contract and the 'law' while enforc-
ing or applying the terms of the collective bargaining agreement." Edwards, supra note 80, at 273-75. 
Edwards argued that the procedure should incorporate the following elements: a specialized panel of 
arbitrators with legal expertise; an authorization to the arbitrators to consider legal principles; an em-
ployee option to use the procedure, with his or her own counsel, and forego filing a charge or lawsuit 
while the arbitration was pending; an expedited process taking no more than sixty days; a transcript of 
the proceedings; a written arbitration decision with findings of fact and conclusions of law; and full 
statutory remedies. Id. at 274-75. 
165. The Dunlop Commission set forth the elements of a fair workplace arbitration procedure in its 
report in 1994. Those include: (I) a neutral arbitrator with knowledge of the law and the concerns of 
the parties; (2) a means of cost-sharing that allows the employee affordable access to the procedure; (3) 
employee choice of representation; (4) availability of all legal remedies; (5) a written opinion contain-
ing the arbitrator's reasoning; (6) employee access to information relevant to the claim through a fair 
and simple procedure; and (7) judicial review to insure consistency with the law. THE DUNLOP 
COMMISSION ON THE FuTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 57 (U.S. Dept. 
of Labor & U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.comell.edu/key 
workplace/2. 
166. The Due Process Protocol, developed by representatives of the National Academy of Arbitrators, 
the American Arbitration Association, the American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties 
No. l] Fallout from 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett 45 
negotiation. The agreement should make provisions for arbitrator payment, also. 
While negotiation of these statutory protections might reduce employer interest in 
arbitration, the employer would still benefit from the absence of a jury, and the 
employee would benefit from the absence of summary judgment, allowing a full 
hearing on the claim. 167 
Because of the overlap of statutory and contractual issues, several of the is-
sues mentioned above would still arise for the union. 168 The union would need to 
preserve the right to intervene to protect its interpretation of the collective bar-
Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Employment Lawyers' Associa-
tion and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution set forth the following elements for a fair 
arbitration procedure: (I) employee choice of representatives; (2) arbitrator authority to award attor-
neys' fees as a remedy; (3) adequate but limited prehearing discovery, including depositions; (4) 
access to names and contact information for the parties in the arbitrator's recent cases; (5) joint selec-
tion of the arbitrator from a roster of impartial arbitrators with diverse backgrounds and relevant legal 
expertise; (6) a written decision consistent with the law and the rules of the agency designating the 
arbitrator; (7) arbitrator authority to award relief allowed by the statute(s) on which the claim is based; 
(8) final and binding awards with limited judicial review; 9) fee sharing unless one party cannot afford 
to do so, in which case other arrangements should be made with efforts to preserve arbitrator neutrali-
ty. See A DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES 
ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, https://www.naarb.org/due_process/ 
due_process.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). 
167. Of course, since the procedure is negotiable, the parties could include in it whatever best fit their 
circumstances, and employers might seek a procedure for summary judgment or other favorable provi-
sions such as precluding class arbitration. In Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bau.le, the Supreme Court held 
that whether an arbitration agreement allows class claims is a matter of contract to be decided by the 
arbitrator. 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003). The Court is currently considering the question of the whether to 
vacate an award under the Federal Arbitration Act where the arbitrator allowed class arbitration under 
an agreement that did not address the matter of cla~s arbitration. See Justices Asked to Prohibit Class 
Arbitration When Parties' Contract Is Silent on the Issue, 235 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at AA-I (Dec. 
10, 2009). Employers frequently use arbitration to avoid class action lawsuits. See Ann C. Hodges, 
Can Compulsory Arbitration Be Reconciled with Section 7 Rights?, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 
205-07 (2003) (discussing impact of class actions on employers and their desire to avoid them using 
arbitration agreements); Paul E. Starkman, Open Issues After Circuit City: Still No Easy Answers on 
Mandatory Arbitration, 27 EMP. REL. L.J. at 69, 76 (2002) (noting that arbitration can prevent class 
actions, the "bane of employers"). The law regarding whether banning class actions invalidates an 
arbitration agreement is unsettled. See Hodges, supra, at 211-18 (discussing conflicting cases and also 
arguing that a class action ban violates the National Labor Relations Act). An arbitral ban on class 
actions could discourage claims regarding failure to pay overtime or failure to pay for preliminary and 
postliminary activities, since these cases involve small amounts of damages for each individual, which 
would be outweighed by the cost of arbitration. See Aggressive Plaintiffs' Bar, Labor Secretary Spot-
lighting FL.SA Compliance, Speaker Says, 127 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at C-1 (July 7, 2009) (discuss-
ing explosion of Fair Labor Standards Act claims, including collective actions); Hodges, supra, at 211-
16 (discussing impact of arbitral ban on collective actions on Fair Labor Standards Act cases which 
typically involve small individual claims); Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., 90 Cal. Rptr. 539, 552 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2009) (finding waiver of class arbitration unconscionable in case involving alleged violation 
of state law requiring meal and rest period breaks because, inter alia, the size of each individual's 
claim was small). Cf Pomposi v. GameStop, Inc, No. 3:09-cv-340, 2010 WL 147196 (D. Conn., Jan. 
11, 2010) (finding that collective action waiver did not make arbitration agreement unenforceable in 
claim for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act and state law because the disparity between 
the cost and the potential recovery was not so great as to make individual litigation or arbitration 
ineffective). For a case where collective claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act were intertwined 
with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, see Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 
591 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that collective bargaining agreement provision excluding chang-
ing of clothes from compensable time covered putting on and removing protective equipment and 
therefore the employees were not entitled to pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, which allows 
unions and employers to exclude pay for changing clothes through collective bargaining). 
168. See supra notes 147-148, 151 and accompanying text. 
46 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2010 
gaining agreement and the rights of other employees. With a separate procedure 
controlled by the employee and his or her chosen representative, however, the 
union may have a stronger argument that the duty of fair representation does not 
apply. 169 While the employee may still have some difficulty obtaining counsel, 
the difficulty would not be exacerbated by limits on damages and attorneys' 
fees. 170 The presence of the union, with its institutional knowledge, and the pro-
tection provided for potential employee witnesses against retaliation by the con-
tractual requirement of just cause for discipline, might make these cases more 
attractive to attorneys than cases requiring arbitration in nonunion workplace. 
Additionally, outside counsel for unions might provide a ready source of attorneys 
for employees in these cases. 171 
With a separate procedure or modified traditional procedure for statutory 
claims, there would remain a need to determine which claims belong to which 
forum. As noted earlier, many contractual and statutory claims overlap and could 
be properly brought in either forum. The best option may be to provide that the 
employee can bring the claim in either forum but not both. 172 The contractual 
grievance procedure still would have some appeal because of union representation 
and the ability to assert both contractual and statutory claims in many cases. For 
example, if the contract contain a nondiscrimination clause, a discharge could be 
challenged both as without just cause and discriminatory. In the statutory proce-
dure, the only claim would be discrimination. But the statutory procedure would 
provide employees with discovery, statutory damages, and the right to choose 
their own representative. Employees who did not grieve quickly enough might be 
limited to statutory claims because of the longer limitations period. To avoid 
deprivation of a forum, the contract could contain provisions that would preserve 
the right to the statutory procedure if the union did not arbitrate the contractual 
claim. 
An alternative to the employee option would be to negotiate specific guide-
lines about which disputes belong in which forum or to allow the union to decide 
(which would still require specified criteria to minimize duty of fair representation 
169. See Hodges, supra note 35, at 155-56 and cases cited therein (noting that duty of fair representa-
tion arose from the exclusivity of union representation in negotiations and contract administration and 
should not be applied in situations, such as statutory claims, where the employee is not bound to union 
representation). Under this theory, while negotiation of the procedure would be subject to the duty, 
arbitration of claims would not be. 
170. Any limitations on discovery might continue to discourage counsel if they appear to create 
difficulty in proving the claim. See supra notes 136, 152 and accompanying text; Palefsky, supra note 
152, at 535; Maltby, supra note 152, at 33. 
171. The union should avoid preferential treatment of any employee in referral to counsel or assis-
tance with the claim, however, unless it is clear that the duty of fair representation doesn't apply or the 
difference is based on nondiscriminatory, relevant factors such as the merits of the claim. See supra 
notes 131, 151-152 and accompanying text. 
172. In the public sector, where employees may have both civil service or tenure and contractual 
protection, they often have a choice of claims. See MASS. GEN. L. ANN. Ch. !SOE § 8 (West 2004) 
(providing that employees with collective bargaining agreements may elect to use the grievance and 
arbitration procedure and if they do, it is the exclusive method of resolving disputes rather than the 
provisions of the civil service law which provide for hearings when employees are disciplined or 
terminated); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 179.A20(4) (West 2006) (slating that employees covered by both 
collective bargaining agreements and civil service systems may pursue a claim under the grievance 
procedure or the civil service appeals procedure but not both, and that teachers may choose arbitration 
under a collective bargaining agreement or a hearing before the school board but not both). 
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problems.) 173 In the latter case, the criteria would be applied by the union alone 
and not subject to contractually binding requirements. Unlike the employee op-
tion, the union decision probably would be subject to the duty of fair representa-
tion, as it would bind the employee because the employee is exclusively 
represented by the union. 174 
Use of this alternative would meet the employer's objective of avoiding two 
bites at the apple, while providing a more appropriate forum for statutory arbitra-
tion. It would avoid forcing statutory claims into the contractual procedure, which 
is not designed for such claims. The enhanced procedures would reduce the like-
lihood of employee legal challenge to the procedure. While more claims would 
reach arbitration than would be the case if claims were limited to union-
represented traditional arbitration, the employer would obtain a single forum with 
some advantages over the courts. The union would have the benefit of providing 
the employees with a better arbitral forum than many nonunion employees have 
and might be able to persuade the courts not to apply the duty of fair representa-
tion to its decisions regarding employee statutory claims. 
5. Optional Arbitration 
A final possibility is negotiation of an option for employees, which permits 
them to arbitrate or litigate but not both. This approach could be used with either 
the traditional labor arbitration procedure or with the addition of an alternative 
procedure. The advantage of this approach for the employer is that it limits the 
employee to one forum for overlapping contractual and legal claims. If the union 
can completely waive the employees' right to litigate, then an election of remedies 
provision should be permissible as well. 175 To insure compliance with the duty of 
fair representation, the union should provide information to all employees with 
potential legal claims about the election provision of the agreement and recom-
mend consultation with an attorney to assist in making the decision. Further the 
parameters of choice should be carefully considered. Would the mere filing of a 
grievance alleging violation of a contract constitute a choice or does the choice 
take place at the point of arbitration when contractual and legal claims overlap?176 
173. See supra notes 130-131, 151-152 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
175. But see EEOC v. Bd. of Governors of State Coils. & Univs., 957 F.2d 424, 431 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(holding that provision of collective bargaining agreement that conditioned the hearing of grievances 
in arbitration upon an employee's refraining from filing discrimination claims under the ADEA and 
Title VII was discriminatory on its face). Cf Richardson v. Comm'n on Human Rts. & Opportunities, 
532 F.3d 114, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding election-of-remedies provision in collective bargaining 
agreement because it was a '"reasonable defensive measure' utilized by [the] employer to litigate 
discrimination claims brought against it effectively and efficiently"), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 56 (2009). 
In their opposition to the petition for certiorari in Richardson, the employer and union cited Pyett, 
arguing that if a waiver is permissible then putting the employee to a choice of remedies is also per-
missible. See Retaliation: High Court Will Not Review Case Where Bargaining Provision Required 
Forum Choice, 191 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at B-8 (Oct. 6, 2009). 
176. It would seem clear from the Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Wajjle House, Inc. that 
regardless of any provision negotiated, the employee could still file a claim with any administrative 
agency with statutory enforcement authority and the agency could litigate if it chose to do so. 534 U.S. 
279, 297 (2002). Given the small number of cases litigated by enforcement agencies, this would not be 
a deterrent to negotiation of waiver provisions, any more than it has deterred those employers who 
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If the choice is made earlier, it must be made with the understanding that there is 
no guarantee of union arbitration of the contractual grievance. The employer, 
however, might be more reluctant to agree to this option if the union's failure to 
arbitrate allowed the employee to choose litigation at that point, assuming the 
statute of limitations has not run. On the other hand, depending on the courts' 
approach to the question left open in Pyett, this may be the result in any case. 177 
C. The Impact of Negotiated Waivers on Legalism in Arbitration 
If I am correct that more waivers will be negotiated after Pyett, then legalism 
will almost certainly increase in traditional labor arbitration, unless legal claims 
are funneled to a separate statutory arbitration procedure. Although the overlap of 
legal and contractual claims has contributed to the increasing legalism to date, 178 
incorporation of a waiver will add more legal issues to arbitration. 179 The possi-
bility of duty of fair representation suits from employees who have no forum for 
their legal claims may encourage unions to arbitrate more cases involving legal 
claims. Almost certainly, those unions that can afford to do so will feel compelled 
to consult legal counsel more often and perhaps involve them in arbitration be-
cause of the legal uncertainties resulting from Pyett and the concerns about duty 
of fair representation claims. 
Even if resource limitations restrict the number of arbitrations, the legal 
claims will likely take on more prominence in arbitration. Duty of fair representa-
tion claims are less likely if any legal issues are raised and ruled on by the arbitra-
tor. While cases to date have left to unions the choice of arbitration strategy, even 
where the union declined to raise legal arguments and focused on contractual 
claims instead} 80 if an employee's subsequent legal claim is precluded, an in-
crease in duty of fair representation claims is a predictable result. Such claims are 
costly for the union to defend and drain resources that could be used for employee 
representation. Thus, attorneys may advise the union to make the legal arguments 
even if they are deemed weak or less persuasive than the contractual argument, so 
long as the legal argument is not detrimental to the union's interests. The em-
ployer also has an incentive to focus on legal issues, for it will want to insure that 
even if the employee somehow persuades a court to hear the case, the legal issue 
will have been decided and the court will give the arbitrator's decision great 
desire to impose arbitration on their nonunion employees. See Mahony & Wheeler, supra note 105, at 
375 (noting that in 2000, the EEOC filed only 291 of 21,302 discrimination cases). In fiscal year 2009, 
the agency filed only 276 lawsuits, continuing a five year trend of declining legal actions initiated by 
the agency. EEOC Filed Fewer Suits in Fiscal 2009, Law Firm Says, 217 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-
l (Nov. 13, 2009). EEOC reports filing 281 lawsuits in 2009, while receiving 93,277 charges of dis-
crimination in the private sector. Charge Intake Remains High at EEOC, Which Had Record Monetary 
Results in FY09, 220 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-7 (Nov. 18, 2009). Regardless of which figure is 
correct for 2009 lawsuits, the number is miniscule in comparison to charges filed. 
177. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
178. Feller, supra note 96, at 113-24. 
179. I do not want to overemphasize the effect of Pyett on legalism. While I anticipate negotiation of 
some waivers, not all contracts will include them and the absence of waivers will limit Pyett's effect on 
legalism. As noted infra, however, even where waivers are not intentionally negotiated Pyett may 
affect the decisions of unions, employers and employees regarding which cases to arllitrate and which 
arguments to emphasize in arbitration. See infra notes 189-224 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text. 
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weight or perhaps even preclusive effect. 181 Even where the employee has opted 
for grievance arbitration and waived litigation under a contract with an employee 
option, the risk-averse union and employer are likely to emphasize any legal ar-
guments in hopes of foreclosing any potential for later litigation. 
Where the employee is free to arbitrate if the union declines, the number of 
legal claims in arbitration will increase, for at least some employees will choose to 
arbitrate. 182 If possible, 183 the employees will hire attorneys who specialize in the 
legal claims at issue. Like attorneys representing unions in traditional labor arbi-
tration, these attorneys will demand more legal process. 184 Arbitrators will see 
more pure legal claims in labor arbitration and arbitrators with legal expertise may 
obtain more appointments. If the process is not amended for legal claims, howev-
er, some employees and their attorneys may choose to fight arbitration in court. If 
employees frequently and successfully challenge the arbitration provision in court 
as unconscionable or more likely, insufficient for vindication of statutory rights, 
Pyett's effect on legalism in arbitration will be impacted. If employees are able to 
escape arbitration, then either the procedures will be modified by the parties, al-
most certainly becoming more legalistic, 185 or more legal claims will be brought in 
court, and arbitration will return to its pre-Pyett form. Given the Supreme Court's 
current preference for arbitration, however, along with that of some lower courts, 
it seems likely that, over time, the bases for employee challenges to arbitration 
may be limited, confining more employees to arbitration. 
The use of a separate procedure for arbitration of legal claims should minim-
ize increasing legalism in the labor arbitration procedure as a result of Pyett. 
Some cases with overlapping legal and contractual claims that would have been 
arbitrated under the contract may end up in the statutory procedure, particularly if 
potential damage awards are higher. Many cases in the statutory procedure will 
be those that would have been litigated instead, however. The statutory procedure 
would certainly be legalistic, although the extent will depend on the precise ele-
ments negotiated by the parties. It is possible that, over time, legalism might ac-
tually decrease in the contractual procedure where a statutory procedure exists, but 
that is an unlikely prospect. There will still be legal issues, like the FMLA, 186 that 
intertwine with contractual issues and provide legal arguments to support contrac-
tual claims in arbitration. Additionally, the parties are accustomed to the more 
181. See infra notes 199-224 and accompanying text discussing two post-Pyett cases where one 
district court found an arbitration decision under a collective bargaining agreement preclusive in the 
absence of a waiver and another deferred to a contractual arbitration decision in a statutory action. 
182. Employees might also choose to fight the arbitration requirement, arguing that the traditional 
union grievance procedure contains insufficient safeguards to insure that employees can effectively 
vindicate their statutory rights. See supra notes 153-162 and accompanying text. 
183. See supra note 152. 
184. See Sylvester Garrett, The Role of Lawyers in Arbitration, 14 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 102, 
105-114 (1961); Albert Brundage, Discussion, 14 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 124, 125 (1961); Robert 
H. Canan, Discussion, 14 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 129, 130-32 (1961); Dash, supra note 42, at 110. 
But see Perry A. Zirkel & Andriy Krahmal, Creeping Legalism in Grievance Arbitration: Fact or 
Fiction?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 243, 259 (2001) (noting that there is not sufficient data to 
demonstrate an actual increase in legal formalism). 
185. The parties might add discovery, for example. 
186. As noted earlier, challenges to discipline for absenteeism will often involve claims that the 
employee was penalized for absences protected by the FMLA. Malin, supra note 49, at 25-26. 
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legalistic process that has evolved and are likely to continue to use it. 187 Even 
nonlawyers who arbitrate use legalized processes. Indeed, some arbitrators have 
suggested that the nonlawyers find the legal procedures more appealing than the 
lawyers. 188 Thus, in all probability, the contractual procedure will not change 
even if some legal claims are relegated to a separate arbitration procedure. 
With an employee option, legalism in arbitration may increase but less than 
with a binding arbitration provision. If the choice is between the labor arbitration 
procedure and litigation, then legalism in labor arbitration will increase where 
employees choose that option. Whether the employee or the union is controlling 
the arbitration, the legal issues will not be ignored and will probably be empha-
sized. The union will focus on the legal issues, if only to avoid a duty of fair re-
presentation claim. If a statutory procedure is negotiated, however, the impact on 
labor arbitration should be reduced. 
D. The Impact of Waiver Uncertainty on Legalism 
Pyett will almost certainly encourage more employers to contest unionized 
employees' lawsuits, urging waiver on the basis of existing contract language. 
While Pyett held that waivers are permissible and Wright held that waivers must 
be clear and unmistakable, neither gave crystal clear direction as to what contrac-
tual language is required to meet the test. The Pyett Court found a waiver because 
the plaintiffs had effectively conceded the issue in the courts below. Nevertheless, 
the contract language there, which barred discrimination under a list of laws in-
cluding the ADEA and stated in the same provision that the grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure was the "sole and exclusive remedy" for such claims, would seem 
to constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver. 189 Wright provided some further 
guidance. 190 It found the general arbitration provision, referring to arbitration of 
"matters in dispute" insufficient, stating that the reference could be solely to con-
tract matters. 191 The Court there further noted the contract did not incorporate the 
statute and did not even contain a non-discrimination clause.192 As noted pre-
viously, the Fourth Circuit has interpreted Wright in a series of cases, articulating 
two circumstances where it will find a clear and unmistakable waiver. Either an 
arbitration clause that includes statutory claims or incorporation of a statute into 
an agreement with an arbitration provision waives the right to litigate. 193 A gener-
187. As Arbitrator Dennis Nolan points out, the procedure has evolved in response to the needs and 
desires of the parties. Nolan, supra note 105. Proposals to simplify and reduce formality abound, 
however, and some parties utilize processes that eschew some of the formalities of litigation. See, e.g., 
Nicolau, supra note 41. One unresolved question after Pyett is whether courts will bind employees to 
arbitrate under such systems or give weight, preclusive or otherwise, to decisions from such tribunals. 
See Hyde, supra note 2 (discussing whether the decision in Pyett will be applied to dispute resolution 
systems using joint labor-management grievance committees as the final step in the grievance proce-
dure); Saunders v. Int'/ Longshoremen's Ass'n, 265 F. Supp. 2d 624, 627-28 (E.D. Va. 2003) (finding 
waiver of judicial forum where grievances were heard by a joint labor-management committee rather 
than a neutral arbitrator). 
188. Zack, supra note 42, at 108; Garrett, supra note 184, at 107-08. 
189. For the full provision, see supra note 99. 
190. Wright v. Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) 
191. Id. at 80. 
192. Id. 
193. See Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d 319, 322 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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al anti-discrimination requirement or a clause that tracks the statutory language is 
insufficient to waive the right to litigate in the Fourth Circuit, however. 194 
If the Fourth Circuit's test prevails, it is doubtful that unintentional waivers 
will be widespread. Without a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court as to 
what constitutes an effective waiver, however, employers have an incentive to 
move to dismiss employee lawsuits if the contract language can even arguably be 
construed as requiring arbitration.195 Where arbitration has already occurred, the 
waiver argument will be combined with arguments for preclusion and deferral. 
Further, post-Pyett, unions cannot afford to dismiss legal arguments on the 
grounds that the employee can bring those claims elsewhere, unless it is certain 
that no waiver exists. Plaintiffs' lawyers will be looking for ways to avoid arbitra-
tion (or deference to an unfavorable arbitration award that has already issued). 
The obvious answer is a suit for duty of fair representation against the union. 
Accordingly, the well-advised union faced with a grievance where there are poten-
tial legal claims will assess the contract to determine whether a waiver argument 
is possible. 
If the union is certain no waiver exists, it might eschew arbitration in some 
cases to allow the employee to sue without having to contend with a prior arbitra-
tion decision, particularly if the employee has an attorney and has already decided 
to take legal action. 196 But the mere possibility of a waiver argument might cause 
the union to arbitrate more cases with legal implications or to make more legal 
arguments in those cases that it would have arbitrated on contractual grounds. 
And more legal arguments portend more lawyers in arbitration and more emphasis 
on judicial-like procedures. Again, the rationale traces back to avoiding duty of 
fair representation claims. Resource limitations will have some dampening effect 
on this trend. But despite those limitations, the influence will be present and may 
well cause more legalism in arbitration. 
E. The Impact of Pyett on Preclusion and the Weight Accorded to Arbitral 
Decisions by Courts 
In Pyett, Justice Thomas distinguished Gardner-Denver as a preclusion case 
rather than a case about enforcement of an arbitration agreement waiving a judi-
cial forum for statutory claims. 197 In a footnote, however, the opinion suggested 
that Gardner-Denver might be ripe for overruling given the alteration in the 
Court's view of arbitration since 1974.198 A few lower courts have read Pyett 
194. Id. at 323; Carson v. Giant Food Inc., 175 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1999). 
195. This trend has already started. See, e.g., Catrino v. Ocean City, No. WMN-09-505, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 59783, at *8-9 (D. Md. July 14, 2009); Dunnigan v. Peoria, No. 09-CV-1064, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 71797, at *6-9 (C.D. Ill. July IS, 2009); Markell v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, No. CV. 08-
752-PK, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 95891, at * 19-20 (D. Or. Sept. 14, 2009); Shipkevich v. Staten Island 
Univ. Hosp., No. 08-CV-1008, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 51011, at *5-7 (E.D.N.Y. June 16, 2009). 
196. Any decision may be given weight by the court and a negative decision could adversely affect 
the employee's statutory claim. See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
197. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1467-69 (2009). 
198. Id. at 1469 n.8. The declaration was qualified by the statement that overruling would be appro-
priate if the dissent's broad reading of the case was correct. Id. 
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broadly,199 precluding litigation or deferring to the arbitration, in contradiction to 
Gardner-Denver, which refused to do either. This expansive reading of Pyett may 
be prompted by the footnote suggesting that Gardner-Denver may no longer be 
good law or by the recognition that Pyett rejected much of the rationale underly-
ing Gardner-Denver. 
In Mathews v. Denver Newspaper Agency LLP, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Colorado found the plaintiffs Title VII claims precluded by a prior 
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement.200 The court concluded that 
there was no waiver of a right to a judicial forum, but because the plaintiff partici-
pated in arbitration using his own lawyer and the arbitrator considered and de-
cided the claim that his demotion was discriminatory, the court applied res judica-
ta to bar the judicial action.201 While the court seemed to suggest that the statuto-
ry claim was arbitrated, the judge quoted the arbitrator as stating that the contrac-
tual anti-discrimination provision recognized that actions that violate the statute 
also violate the contract and provided a contractual remedy for those violations. 202 
The court followed by stating that the parties "recognized that the CBA's arbitra-
tion agreement covered Plaintiffs statutory claims .... "203 
But making a statutory violation also a contract violation is not the same as 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, thereby waiving the right to go to court. 
Employers and unions regularl1i contract to bar discrimination on the same bases 
as the law in their agreements. 04 Contracts also commonly state that the parties 
agree to comply with the law. And where the contract provision parallels the law, 
arbitrators will typically look to the law for guidance in interpreting the contract. 
199. A few lower courts reached similar conclusions after Wright, so perhaps I am overemphasizing 
the potential effect of these decisions. See, e.g., Clarke v. UFJ, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (applying preclusive effect to the decision of the arbitrator, although also finding a waiver, albeit 
on dubious grounds); Serafin v. Conn. Dep't of Mental Health & Addiction Servs., No. 3:98CV398, 
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3603 (D. Conn. Mar. 9, 2005) (precluding litigation of FMLA claim because 
plaintiff voluntarily arbitrated her statutory claim under the collective bargaining agreement at her own 
expense, with her own attorney and without the union). It is possible that unions and employers will 
not change their current practices with respect to contractual grievances with legal implications. Be-
cause Pyett clearly authorized a waiver, however, interest has been widespread among attorneys prac-
ticing in the field and thus, the case and those of the lower courts interpreting it seem likely to have an 
impact on the practices of unions and employers. See Kevin P. McGowan, Supreme Court Ruling on 
Arbitration Could Hurt Unions, Workers With Bias Claims, Lawyer Warns, 62 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
at AA-I (Apr. 3, 2009); Lawrence E. Dube, Panelists Discuss High Court's Pyett Ruling and Issues 
Confronting Contract Negotiators, 146 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at B-1 (Aug. 3, 2009); Lawrence E. 
Dube, ABA Panelists See Legal, Practical Issues Remaining After High Court's Pyett Ruling, 213 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at C-3 (Nov. 6, 2009). 
200. No. 07-CV-02097, 2009 WL 1231776 (D. Colo. May 4, 2009). 
201. Id. at *5-6. 
202. Id. at *5. 
203. Id. 
204. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contempo-
rary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 313, 319 (2007) (citing BNA, Basic 
Patterns in Union Contracts, finding that in 1995, eighty-seven percent of union contracts contained 
non-discrimination clauses); Components of the Contract, Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. 
(BNA), at 8:3701 (stating that almost all collective bargaining agreements contain nondiscrimination 
clauses based on some or all of the following categories: "race, color, creed, religion, gender, national 
origin, age, qualified disability, marital status, or sexual orientation"). Indeed failure include a nondi-
scrimination clause in the agreement may risk a finding of liability for discrimination. See Hodges, 
supra note 35, at 162-63. 
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But a non-discrimination clause or an agreement to comply with the law is not a 
waiver of the right to go to court on the legal claim.205 
The court, perhaps justifiably, may have been unhappy with the plaintiff's at-
tempt to end run the result of the arbitration decision in a case where he controlled 
the arbitration and the arguments made therein,206 but Gardner-Denver, which 
was not overruled, rejects the application of preclusion based on a contractual 
arbitration. 207 Gardner-Denver also rejected the application of the doctrine of 
election of remedies.208 The Mathews court seems to hold that even without a 
contractual waiver, an employee may waive the right to litigate by participating in 
an arbitration that raises discrimination claims analogous to the law and using the 
law to interpret the agreement.209 
Although it is not clear from the opinion, it is possible that Mathews pre-
sented his Title VII claims directly to the arbitrator. If so, the court's decision is 
more understandable. Yet it seems a subtle distinction since arbitrators regularly 
look to the law to interpret contractual provisions patterned after the law.210 Did 
Mathews truly understand that he was waiving his right to litigate? And what 
guidance does this offer the union? If it makes the legal argument it risks waiving 
the employee's right to litigate even in the absence of a contractual waiver, yet if 
it does not, it may lose the claim or provoke a duty of fair representation suit by 
the employee. 
Another troubling post-Pyett decision is Tewolde v. Owens & Minor Distribu-
tion, Inc. 211 The union arbitrated and lost two grievances, one challenging the 
employer's refusal to promote Tewolde and the other challenging his subsequent 
discipline, discharge, and discriminatory assignment of cleaning duties.212 Te-
wolde filed a statutory discrimination claim based on the failure to promote and 
later a claim alleging that the assignment of cleaning duties and the discipline and 
discharge constituted statutory retaliation.213 The court read Pyett as requiring "an 
extraordinary level of deference"214 to an arbitrator's decision, citing a section of 
the opinion relating to judicial review of an arbitrator's decision under the Federal 
Arbitration Act.215 The court stated that if an arbitrator's decision could directly 
limit judicial review of a claim based on a statute, then deference that precludes 
statutory claims is also warranted.216 But this was precisely the distinction made 
205. See supra notes 100-101, 190-194 and accompanying text. 
206. It is not clear whether the court would have reached the same result had the union, rather than 
the plaintiff, arbitrated the claim. 
207. In Gardner-Denver, there was a nondiscrimination clause in the agreement and the issue of race 
discrimination was raised in the arbitration hearing but the arbitrator did not address it directly, ruling 
only that the discharge was for just cause. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 42, & n.2. The 
court found that arbitration of the contractual claim of discrimination did not preclude litigation of a 
statutory claim of discrimination. Id. at 52. 
208. Id. at 50-51. 
209. The Court in Gardner-Denver said "mere resort to the arbitral forum to enforce contractual 
rights constitutes no such waiver." Id. at 52. 
210. Sovern, supra note 58, at 30. 
211. No. 07-CV-4075, 2009 WL 1653533 (0. Minn. June IO, 2009). 
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by Justice Thomas between Pyett and Gardner-Denver. Gardner-Denver express-
ly rejected both preclusion and deferral to arbitrators' decisions on contractual 
issues arising out of the same facts. 217 While the Gardner-Denver Court did hold 
that the court could give to the arbitrator's decision the weight that it warranted,218 
the Tewolde court "deferred" to the decisions of the arbitrators, granting summary 
judgment against Tewolde.219 Perhaps this is only a matter of semantics and the 
court used the term "deferral" as equivalent to giving substantial weight to the 
decision, which is clearly permissible. Since the court engaged in some discus-
sion of the facts this is a plausible interpretation, although the court certainly 
should have been more careful in its language. 
Mathews and Tewolde illustrate the potential for an expansive reading of the 
Pyett decision.220 While other courts have declined to read Pyett so broadly,221 
these two decisions alone have implications for legalism in arbitration. Since 
some courts have eroded the impact of Gardner-Denver by precluding litigation 
or deferring to labor arbitration decisions, the union and employer must consider 
the possibility that others will follow. They cannot ignore the legal implications 
of contractual arbitrations and are more likely to consult with legal counsel when 
faced with arbitration of such a claim. Even where there is no waiver, as in the 
cases discussed above, the parties must consider the potential effect of Pyett. 
These cases create a dilemma for the union contemplating arbitration. One 
strategy would be to downplay or avoid the legal issues, in hopes of preserving 
them for the employee's later lawsuit. Since the union's expertise is contractual 
issues, a focus on the contractual arguments may provide the greatest chance of 
prevailing in the arbitration. If the union wins the case, the adverse impact on any 
subsequent legal claim will be limited.222 In some cases, however, the legal ar-
217. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 55-59 (1974). 
218. /d.at60. 
219. Tewolde, 2009 WL 1653533, at *10. 
220. These cases suggest that the Pyett decision may have returned us to the state of the law prior to 
Gardner-Denver, where courts variously treated legal claims following contractual arbitrations using 
the doctrines of deferral, election of remedies and preclusion. See Siber, supra note 96, at 711-13. 
Gardner-Denver settled the law by rejecting the application of all three doctrines, but it appears that 
Pyett has reinvigorated them despite declining to overrule Gardner-Denver. 
221. In Markell v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, for example, the Oregon District Court refused to 
accord preclusive effect to a contractual arbitration decision in a legal action for discrimination arising 
out of the same facts, where there was no agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. No. 08-CV-752, 
2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 95891, at *20-21 (D. Or. Oct. 15, 2009). And in Catrina v. Ocean City, the 
District Court of Maryland found that where the arbitration provision covered only contractual dis-
crimination claims, Gardner-Denver rather than Pyett applied and therefore rejected the employer's 
preclusion and election of remedies arguments. No. WMN-09-505, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 59783, at 
*13-14, (D. Md. July 14, 2009). Accord, St. Aubin v. Unilever HPC, NA, No. 09 C 1874, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 55626, at *9-11 (N.D. Ill. June 26, 2009). 
222. The employee might still choose to litigate a legal claim to obtain additional damages unavaila-
ble in arbitration. If the arbitration is given res judicata effect, however, the employee will be unable to 
proceed on the statutory claim. Res judicata should only apply if the statutory claim is actually litigated 
in the arbitration. Res judicata or claim preclusion applies to foreclose a party from relitigating a claim 
which was or could have been litigated in a prior case. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. 
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 18 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE§ 4402. Since Pyett requires a 
waiver of the right to litigate the statutory claim, if there is no waiver and no litigation of the statutory 
claim, a court should not bar an employee from litigation on the grounds that the claim was or should 
have been litigated in the arbitration. Absent application of res judicata, a victory in arbitration should 
benefit the employee on the statutory claim. 
No. 1] Fallout from 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett 55 
gument may be either stronger or unavoidable. Additionally, even if a court does 
not find the arbitration preclusive or defer to it, it may give the arbitrator's deci-
sion great weight.223 Failure to raise the legal argument may prevent it from ever 
being heard and thereby prompt a duty of fair representation claim. Consultation 
with the employee or the employee's attorney, if one has been hired, may assist 
the union in deciding how to handle the case and may reduce the likelihood of a 
duty of fair representation claim against the union. 
Given these difficulties in determining the best approach in arbitration, many 
unions are likely to employ an attorney to evaluate cases with legal implications to 
determine whether, and to what extent, to make legal arguments.224 Even if legal 
arguments are deemphasized in a particular case, the increased use of attorneys in 
arbitration will insure that judicial-like procedures are prominent features of arbi-
tration. 
As for employers, their arguments will respond to those made by unions. If 
the unions urge legal claims, management will respond to them. Management's 
task is simpler, however. The goal is to win the arbitration on whatever ground 
makes the strongest argument. A victory will allow the employer, even in the 
absence of a waiver of the right to litigate, to argue that the arbitrator's decision is 
preclusive, entitled to deference, or entitled to great weight. Acceptance of any of 
these arguments virtually guarantees that the employer will prevail in court after a 
successful arbitration. Like the union, however, the employer is more likely to 
use an attorney in the arbitration if it anticipates a subsequent legal action. The 
importance of a victory is enhanced, as it will do double duty. Saving money by 
foregoing legal counsel in arbitration will be viewed as penny wise and pound 
foolish in such cases. The lawyer will have the expertise to assess the case and 
determine the best strategy for prevailing in both litigation and arbitration. Ac-
cordingly, even in cases where no waiver exists, Pyett has the potential to increase 
legalism in arbitration. 
N. ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION 
Pyett might prompt unions to consider alternatives to arbitration to achieve 
the goals of increased compliance with statutory requirements and quicker, cheap-
er resolution of disputes. Mediation of legal claims offers an alternative method 
of resolving disputes that may meet the needs of employers, unions, and em-
223. Early evidence regarding application of Gardner-Denver indicated that subsequent litigation 
seldom resulted in a decision that differed from the outcome of labor arbitration. See Michele M. 
Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, Arbitrating Discrimination Grievances in the Wake of Gardner-
Denver, 106 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 6 (1983); Michele M. Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, The 
Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, 39 ARB. J. 49, 55 
(1984). See also Malin, supra note 49, at 21-23 (discussing cases where courts rely on prior arbitration 
awards to decide statutory claims). 
224. Again, I do not want to overemphasize the extent to which unions will draw on attorneys in 
grievances with legal implications. Resource limitations may affect decisions as to how often to use 
attorneys in arbitration. Some unions may limit the use of attorneys despite the risks involved in these 
cases. Some unions may continue to operate as they have pre-Pyett. If duty of fair representation 
claims increase, however, unions may be forced to reevaluate these decisions. 
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ployees.225 Mediation would not preclude litigation but might resolve disputes, 
effectively reducing the need for legal action, accomplishing the employer's goal 
of reducing the cost of dispute resolution and avoiding litigation. Unions could 
assist employees in mediation, reducing their costs as well. Since Pyett has 
created a need to train union representatives about legal issues, this training could 
aid unions in representing their constituents in mediation as well, providing an 
additional benefit to union members. Because of the potential overlap between 
contractual and legal claims, unions negotiating a mediation option would need to 
ensure that mediation neither interfered with the arbitration of contractual claims 
nor lulled employees into complacency about the need to file charges to preserve 
their legal claims.226 A carefully crafted mediation option, however, might result 
in the resolution of some statutory claims to the satisfaction of all parties. Divert-
ing some claims to mediation might also reduce the number of legal claims in 
arbitration, thereby limiting legalism to some extent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Unions can and should be strong advocates for employee legal rights. The 
decision in Pyett should prompt unions and their attorneys to reconsider the best 
way for unions to protect employees from violations of both their contractual and 
legal rights. 227 The unresolved questions in the case will hamper efforts to re-
spond most effectively to the decision, however. Various unions and employers 
may reach different conclusions on how to respond to Pyett in contract negotia-
tions, arbitration, and court. If more legal claims are arbitrated in the traditional 
labor arbitration system, however, legalism is likely to increase. Union officials 
and human resource personnel may be replaced in arbitration by attorneys. An 
alternative arbitration or a mediation system for legal claims may help preserve 
the traditional arbitration system, allowing it to perform its function as an exten-
sion of contract negotiations, with the arbitrator as an expert "contract reader" for 
the parties.228 Given the common overlap of legal and contractual claims, the 
uncertainties remaining from unresolved issues in Pyett, and the ever present spec-
ter of duty of fair representation claims for unions, however, creating an effective 
alternative system may prove difficult. 
225. For in depth discussion of mediation of legal claims in the unionized workplace, see Hodges, 
supra note 117. 
226. See id. at 437-38. For example, under Title VII, the ADA and ADEA, charges must be timely 
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as a prerequisite to any legal action. See 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2006); The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(I) (2006); The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
42. U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006). 
227. Marion Crain and Ken Matheny suggested some years ago that allowing unions to waive em-
ployee rights to litigate might encourage unions to become more active in supporting the rights of 
women and workers of color and encourage more workers to unionize. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, 
Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1839-45 (2001). See also Cole, supra note 102 (arguing 
that unions can and will effectively represent employees in arbitration of statutory discrimination 
claims). I hope that their rather more optimistic view of the effect of Pyett is correct. I fear, however, 
that the decision, coupled with resource constraints, will create more difficulty for an already belea-
guered labor movement. 
228. St. Antoine, supra note 5, at 1140. 
